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CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Support Services Historical Series

THE OFFICE OF TRAINING, 1 JULY 1951 - 1 JANUARY 1966

VOL. II GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

4 DECEMBER 1953 - 1 JULY 1956

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OTR-6

April 1971

Copy 2 of 4

W A R N I N G

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THE DDS HISTORICAL SERIES

OTR 6


THE OFFICE OF TRAINING, 1 JULY 1951 - 1 JANUARY 1966

VOLUME II GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

4 DECEMBER 1953 - 1 JULY 1956

by

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April 1971

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Hugh T. Cunningham
Director of Training

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Foreword

By December of 1953, the Office of Training had completed a period of formative development and had established both an organizational pattern and a modus operandi that, with minor changes, were to continue until January of 1966. The formative years, from 1 July of 1951 to 4 December of 1953, have been described in the first volume of this paper, Definition and Consolidation, OTR-4. The mission of this, the second volume, is to describe the growth and development of the Office from 4 December of 1953 to 1 July of 1956. Subsequent volumes, Management and Support, July 1956 - January 1966, The Intelligence School, July 1956 - January 1966, and The Language and Area School and The School of International Communism, July 1956 - January 1966 have been drafted; and The Operations School, July 1956 - January 1966 is being written.

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[Redacted] and on the Junior Officer Training Program, later the Career Training Program. Consequently, the 1953-56 developments of those two activities are not fully described in this paper. A separate paper, OTR-3, described Maritime Training through 1954, and only subsequent developments are mentioned here.

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THE OFFICE OF TRAINING, 1 JULY 1951 - 1 JANUARY 1966

Volume II: Growth and Development

4 December 1953 - 1 July 1956

I. Organizational Development

The reorganization of OTR in December of 1953, as described in the preceding volume,* was the first in a series of organizational changes that were to lead from initial consolidation, through a period of rapid expansion, to an organizational stabilization in June of 1956 within which OTR would function effectively for almost a decade.

Although organizational changes were made between June of 1956 and January of 1966, they were ones that did not alter the basic pattern developed before that time. Because the evolution of the pattern itself reflects the overall problems faced and the progress made during this period, the story of growth and development can best be told against the background of organizational development.

* OTR-5.

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A. Results of the 1953 Reorganization

The December 1953 reorganization of OTR was proposed by the DTR and approved -- with reservations -- by the Inspector General.* It was approved because it achieved a major objective: the unification of a house divided. The IG reservations were concerned with the Division structure; the IG felt that the OTR Divisions were not comparable either in size or scope of responsibility with the other CIA divisional components. Mr. Baird recognized this fact, but rather than delay unification of OTR he went ahead with the reorganization -- with the unofficial approval of the DDCI.

Early in 1954 it became apparent that the new organizational pattern was flooding the DTR and the DDTR with administrative detail -- there were eight separate divisions and two major staffs reporting directly to the DTR.** This situation, coupled with the requirement to comply with the IG's recommendations concerning the divisional structure of OTR, led Mr. Baird to request the CIA Management Staff to make a management survey of OTR. The survey was conducted,

* See OTR-5, p. 118.

** See OTR-5, Figure 4, p. 121.

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and although the report itself was not issued until January of 1955, 1/* the findings of the survey became the basis for the reorganization of OTR that became effective on 1 December 1954. 2/

B. Reorganization of 1 December 1954

The major changes brought about by the December 1954 reorganization were related to consolidation of training components and change in component designation from Division to School. ** The new Basic Training School was composed of the former Orientation and Briefing Division, the Management Training Division, Phase I of the Administrative Training Branch of the Basic Training Division, Part I of the former Basic Intelligence Course of the Intelligence Training Division, and the Instructional Techniques Course of the former Instructional Services Staff. The Intelligence Training School replaced the Intelligence Training Division -- minus Part I of the Basic Intelligence Course -- and included the World Communism Course transferred from the Basic Training Division. The Language, Area, and External Training School replaced the External and

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix A.

** See Figure 1, p. 4.


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Figure 1

ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING

1 December 1954



ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1954, SHOWING THE COMBINATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF AND THE INSTRUCTIONAL SERVICES STAFF TO FORM THE SUPPORT STAFF, THE TRANSFER OF THE PLANS AND RESEARCH STAFF TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING, AND THE REORGANIZATION OF THE TRAINING DIVISIONS INTO TRAINING SCHOOLS; BY OTR NOTICE NO. 28-54, 1 DECEMBER 1954.

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Language Training Division. The new Operations Training School was composed of the former Specialized Training Division, the Project Training Division, the Training Division [redacted] including Phase II, Phase III, and the Refresher Branch of the Basic Training Division. The internal structure of the Operations Training

25X1 School was composed of the Office of the Chief, Headquarters Training, [redacted]

3/

Some concept of the scope of training activities for which the various schools were responsible is conveyed by the official OTR Catalog of Courses published in December of 1954. 4/ The Basic Training School offered ten courses, including orientation, administrative, management, clerical, instructional techniques, and reporting courses. The Intelligence Training School offered nine courses covering various types of intelligence production techniques, scientific intelligence, world Communism, briefing and writing skills, and reading improvement. The Language, Area, and External Training School offered five language courses given internally and a number of language and area courses given in non-Agency facilities. The Operations

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Training School offered 19 courses in various kinds of clandestine operations, two categories of covert training courses, and 21 courses in special technical activities associated with clandestine operations.

The December 1954 reorganization made the Plans and Research Staff a component of the Office of the DTR to serve in an advisory capacity without command or directive authority. The former Administrative Staff and Instructional Services Staff were combined to form the Support Staff, with the Executive Officer serving as Chief. The operation [redacted] remained the responsibility of the Executive Officer as Chief of the Support Staff. One rather odd change made in the reorganization -- odd in the light of later developments -- was the removal of the Junior Officer Training Program from divisional status to sub-staff status under the Support Staff.*

25>

On the surface it would appear that the December 1954 reorganization achieved its objectives: to implement the recommendations of the IG and to reduce the DTR's "span of control," thus reducing the bulk of the DTR's and the DDTR's administrative chores. There is,

* See below, p. 8.

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however, a bit of unofficial background that would indicate turbulence beneath the surface. On 6 January 1959, [redacted] 25X
representing the O/DCI Historical Staff, interviewed [redacted] 25X

25X1 [redacted] the CIA Management Staff Examiner who conducted the management survey of OTR in 1954. 5/ [redacted] was concerned with gathering historical information about the development of OTR from 1953 to 1956, and he queried [redacted] about the 1954 survey. The 25X

25X1 [redacted] report of the interview states, in part:

25X1 [redacted] said that . . . the purpose of the report was to reduce the paper work of the Director of Training and to eliminate the great number of people reporting directly to the Director of Training. Colonel Baird gave lip service to the management principles of span of control, [redacted] 25X
25X1 [redacted] said, but in practice he did not want to delegate and he wanted to look at every little piece of paper. The implication was that the report of the survey was a compromise which in practice did not change Colonel Baird's mode of administering his shop very much.

25X1 [redacted] wanted Colonel Baird to accept an organization plan which concentrated all responsibility for training under the Deputy Director for Training. Colonel Baird did not accept this, and there were established the four schools. . . . [redacted] wanted all of the staff elements to be under a single executive officer. Colonel Baird has established as separate staffs the Registrar, the Assessment and Evaluation Staff, the Support Staff, and the Plans and Policy Staff. The Junior Officer Training Program reports to Colonel Baird directly also.

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It would appear, then, that the official report of the management survey was, indeed, a "compromise" as [redacted] suggests. In any event, 25X the reorganization worked; it established the basic pattern of OTR organization as it remained until June of 1956. Minor changes were made, however, early in 1956: in February the Junior Officer Training Program was reestablished at the school level, 6/ and in May the name of the Plans and Research Staff was changed to the Plans and Policy Staff.*

C. Reorganization of 15 June 1956**

The major changes made in the reorganization of OTR that was announced on 15 June 1956 were the establishment of the School of International Communism and the merging of the Basic Training School and the Intelligence Training School to create the Intelligence School. 7/ The other changes were in nomenclature -- the Language, Area, and External Training School became the Language and Area School, and the Operations Training School became the Operations

* See Figure 2, p. 9.


** See Figure 3, p. 10.

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Figure 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING

28 May 1956



ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING AS OF 28 MAY 1956, SHOWING THE REMOVAL OF THE JUNIOR OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM FROM THE SUPPORT STAFF AND ITS ESTABLISHMENT AS A SCHOOL-LEVEL COMPONENT BY CIA REGULATION [REDACTED] 17 FEBRUARY 1956; AND THE CHANGE OF THE NAME OF THE PLANS AND RESEARCH STAFF TO THE PLANS AND POLICY STAFF; BOTH ACTIONS ANNOUNCED BY OTR NOTICE NO. 17-56, 28 MAY 1956.

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
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Figure 3

ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING

15 June 1956



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ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF TRAINING AS OF 15 JUNE 1956,
SHOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNISM, THE MERGER OF THE BASIC TRAINING SCHOOL AND
THE INTELLIGENCE TRAINING SCHOOL AS THE INTELLIGENCE
SCHOOL, THE CHANGE IN NAME FROM LANGUAGE, AREA AND EXTER-
NAL TRAINING SCHOOL TO LANGUAGE AND AREA SCHOOL, AND
THE CHANGE IN NAME FROM OPERATIONS TRAINING SCHOOL TO
OPERATIONS SCHOOL; BY OTR NOTICE NO. 20-56, 15 JUNE 1956.

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School. The Staff structure remained the same, and the [redacted] 25X1 25X

[redacted] continued as a joint activity of the Support Staff and the Operations School.

The origin of the School of International Communism can be traced back to a course in Communist Party Operations given by OSO/ OPC Training Division in 1950. After the nominal merger of TRD with OTR in July of 1951, the course continued as a TR(C) offering --

25X1 under the supervision of [redacted] -- until February of 1952, when it was transferred to the Intelligence Training Division of TR(G) under the supervision of [redacted] Thereafter, 25X until June of 1956, the Communism courses continued as TR(G) offerings, both as separate courses and as one of the phases of the Basic Orientation Course; in 1955 the name of the Communist Party Operations course was changed to World Communism.

In May of 1956, the DTR proposed the establishment of a School of International Communism.^{8/} His proposal embraced three phases of development: in the first phase, the school would concentrate on broadening instruction within the Agency; in the second phase, the school would expand its program to include service to other government agencies; and in the third phase, the school would further

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broaden its program and provide training in Communism to groups outside the government. Mr. Baird's proposal was acted on by the DDCI, who was Acting DCI at the time. He approved the establishment of the school and the first phase of development, he approved the second phase with qualifications, and he withheld approval of the third phase pending further experience with phases one and two. 9/ The DDCI's qualifications concerning phase two were based on security questions raised by the DDP. 10/ Although the formal DDCI approval of the establishment of the school and phase one of the proposed development did not reach the DTR until August of 1956, the existence of the school itself was announced by OTR Notice in June and Dr. Harry Rositzke was named chief.* Apparently, approval of the school had come to the DTR unofficially soon after his memorandum had been sent in May. Phases two and three of the DTR's plan were never officially approved, but the objectives of both phases were achieved

* At the time it was established, the full name of the school was "The School of International Communism and the USSR." There appears to be no official record of the dropping of the "and the USSR" part of the name.

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in some measure; since the School of International Communism was established, its instructors have continuously served as lecturers for both non-Agency and non-government groups.

The merging of the Basic Training School and the Intelligence

25X1 Training School to form the Intelligence School with [redacted]

25X

[redacted]s chief, consisted of shifting the Basic school's faculties to the Intelligence School. These faculties included the instructors in several "non-intelligence" courses -- management, administrative, and clerical courses. The result was a kind of assorted basket of training responsibilities, a repository for "all duties not otherwise assigned."

25X1

[redacted] who became Chief of the school in January of 1957, later described it as "a hodge-podge, a catch-all, an attic, a dumping ground where courses were placed that did not belong anywhere else." 11/ Despite the diversity of its duties, however, the school worked; and within it there developed some of the more sophisticated of OTR's programs -- senior management seminars, the mid-career program, and the intelligence production phases of the Junior Officer Training Program, for example.

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D. Transfer of OTR to the DDS Area

From the beginning of its existence as an Office on 1 July of 1951 OTR was administratively in the Office of the DCI, and the DTR reported directly to the DCI. Actually, the DTR's reports were sent to an Assistant to the DCI, 12/ but the DTR had access to the DCI without intervening channels. The DTR's view of this direct-access arrangement was that "This placed what was essentially an experimental device, the new office, in an advantageous position for growth and development." 13/ Apparently, however, the unique organizational location of OTR was contrary to Agency organizational policy, and on 3 February of 1955 -- implementing an IG recommendation -- the DCI issued a Notice transferring OTR to the Directorate for Support -- a re-designation of the Directorate for Administration, accomplished in the same Notice. 14/

The new administrative location of OTR "provided OTR directly with logistical support and at the same time it permitted the independence necessary for working with other offices in its task of clarifying Agency doctrine and disseminating that doctrine through its schools." 15/ That, of course, was the official evaluation. Unofficially, Mr. Baird had some doubts about the wisdom of the change.

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In 1958 the O/DCI Historical Staff representative interviewed Mr. Baird and asked for his comments on the 1955 transfer. The interviewer reported that Mr. Baird said that "OTR was downgraded and became a subordinate office along with other support offices under the DDS. OTR suffered from being further divorced from operational and substantive organizations. Some operational officers tend to regard support people as unsympathetic. Such attitudes could have been harmful to OTR . . . but this attitude [has] been overcome . . . On the credit side of the ledger, it may be said that OTR gained by being placed under a Deputy who attended the staff meetings of the DCI and reported back on developments. The difference is that now [the DTR] is Director of the Office of Training under the DD/S and before he was Director of Training, CIA." 16/

Whatever the relative merits of the move at the time, in retrospect it seems to have been a fortunate one for OTR. As long as Mr. Dulles was DCI and Gen. Cabell was the DDCI, Mr. Baird might have sustained the effectiveness of the direct-access situation because of his personal friendship with the two men. With Mr. Dulles'

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resignation, however, the Agency's top-management style changed completely, and the DTR might have found himself in an administrative limbo had he not had the DDS to represent his interests.

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II. Administration

Just as the organization of OTR developed and reached stability during the 1953-56 period, so did the administrative pattern within the Office. The key factors in this pattern were the functions of the Office of the DTR, particularly those of the DDTR and the Plans and Policy Staff; the special problems that required the invention of administrative solutions; the management tools with which the internal administrative practices were carried out; and the managerial style that gave tone and color to the administrative pattern. In the following paragraphs these factors will be discussed, and the key personnel involved in the 1953-56 period will be identified and their qualifications described.

A. The Office of the DTR

At the time of the reorganization of OTR in December of 1953, Mr. Baird was most fortunate to have [redacted] as 25X the man who would logically become the single DDIR. Some of the elements of the DDP area were still apprehensive about the effect of the organizational divorce of clandestine training from the covert operational units of the Agency. Aggravating this apprehension was the fact that Mr. Baird was a relative newcomer to the Agency; he

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had had no OSS experience, and he had had no firsthand acquaintance with clandestine operations. [redacted] on the contrary, was a charter member of the club. He had been with OSS, had made the transition from OSS through CIG to CIA, and had held responsible positions in the Agency's clandestine services. In short, he held all of the credentials that DDP officers considered necessary to the proper guidance of clandestine training programs.

25X

Mr. Baird, of course, was well aware of the gap between himself and the clandestine operators, and from the very beginning of his tenure he had made every effort to bridge the gap without appearing to be officious. The appointment of [redacted] was, in effect, a successful bridging of the gap; thereafter the DDP lamentations over the loss of clandestine training began to quiet down, and gradually they faded out altogether -- except for an occasional sob or two that found few sympathetic ears.

25X

It would have been quite understandable at the time if Mr. Baird had immediately delegated to [redacted] all responsibility for clandestine training programs in OTR. He did not, of course. He made full use of the DDTR's close rapport with the clandestine services, and he accepted the DDTR's advice in all matters related

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to clandestine training; but he retained the command function and accepted the responsibilities that went with it. This early, then, Mr. Baird demonstrated a managerial philosophy that was to characterize the administration of OTR as long as Mr. Baird was Director of Training.

25X1

[redacted] -- as did those DDTR's who followed him during Mr. Baird's tenure -- served in an alter ego capacity. During the DTR's absence from his office, the DDTR not only performed the functions of conducting and attending meetings and conferences and signing official action papers but also wielded the DTR's authority to make commitments and command decisions. In other words, the alter ego function of the DDTR was a complete one -- none of Mr. Baird's deputies were men who just watched the store while the boss was away.

The DDTR did, of course, have specific administrative responsibilities in addition to the alter ego function. He acted in the supervisor capacity in the preparation of fitness reports for OTR school and staff chiefs -- with the DTR acting as reviewing officer. He directed the preparation of special reports by the school and staff

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chiefs and of periodic OTR budget presentations, and he served as the top-level trouble shooter in the handling of administrative problems that were not routine.

In this last activity -- one that required a major part of the DDTR's time -- the OTR Plans and Research Staff served as the principal action group. As noted above, the TR(S) Plans and Programs Staff had become the OTR Plans and Research Staff in December of 1953; in December of 1954 the staff was shifted to the Office of the DTR to serve as an advisory group; and in June of 1956 the name of the staff was changed to the Plans and Policy Staff (PPS).*

It was this group that served as the working administrative arm of the DTR and the DDTR. Some of the administrative problems that arose during the 1953-56 period were broad ones involving OTR policy or other factors of Office-wide concern. These problems the Plans and Policy Staff (PPS) handled completely, calling on other OTR components for aid as necessary. Other administrative problems were primarily related to the functions of one of the schools or one of the other staffs. These, too, were handled by the PPS, at least in

* Hereafter, to avoid confusion, the staff is referred to as the Plans and Policy Staff.

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the early stages of their solutions; the PPS would recommend procedures and set deadlines and would review papers before they were submitted to the DTR and the DDTR.

In January of 1955, approximately the mid-point in the 1953-
25X1 56 period, the PPS had a total of [] positions distributed among the
Office of the Chief of the Staff, a Planning Branch, and a Training
Doctrine Branch. In the Office of the Chief of the Staff were the Chief
himself, an administrative assistant, a stenographer, and a clerk-
typist. In the Planning Branch there were [] training officers and a 25X
stenographer; and in the Training Doctrine Branch there were [] 25X
training officers, three educational specialists, a research assistant,
a stenographer, and a clerk-typist. 17/

The official statement of the function of the staff at the time
was this:

The Chief, Plans and Research Staff, in an advisory capacity
to, and under the general direction of, the Director, shall:

1. Review and analyze the training implications in policies,
plans, proposals and projects initiated within or without
the Agency and make appropriate recommendations con-
cerning action which may be taken by the Director of
Training.

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2. Ascertain Agency training requirements and develop, review and coordinate plans, policies, programs and standards designed to meet the requirements.
3. Develop and coordinate training materials and publications for use in all courses of instruction in order to present the intelligence process and operational doctrine of the Agency, and formulate dissemination policy to control the distribution of such publications.
4. Review and evaluate the training effort of the Agency in terms of established training policies, standards and approved doctrine, and make appropriate recommendations.
5. Provide liaison and coordination with other Agency components in matters affecting the training programs. 18/

Commenting on the rationale of this statement of functions, the January 1955 Management Staff report of a survey of OTR stated:

In proposing the organizational structure for the Office of Training set forth herein, it was recognized that the Director would have need for staff support and assistance which would result in recommendations for his command action. The Plans and Research Staff was attached to the Office of the Director in a staff capacity, and out of the line of command, to serve this purpose. Two general categories of staff work were envisioned; one, the analysis of plans, proposals, etc., to determine their impact against the Office of Training, and the development of recommendations for the Director to guide his action; the second would be concerned with the technical aspects of OTR training and would result in recommendations upon which the Director could base his operating decisions. The proposed functions express this concept.

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In order to conserve the time and effort of the Director, this staff may act as a screening agent in the processing of all periodic reports, critiques and other evaluations from the training elements, to remove extraneous and routine matter, and to pass on to the Director only significant details.

In order to maintain the channels of command and responsibility proposed for OTR, this staff should not assume any command or directive authority. Any action deemed necessary as a result of the activity of the Staff should be initiated only by an order from the Director. 19/

Obviously, the charter of the staff was a broad one, and it embraced almost any problem that might have to come to the attention of the DTR. Some concept of the number and kinds of administrative problems that the PPS faced during this time is conveyed by an "Index" to an "OTR Policy Book" that was compiled in the Office of the DTR, probably in May of 1955. 20/ This Index listed three Sections: I, Personnel Policies, with nine subdivisions ranging from "Selection of Personnel for the Office of Training" through "Exit Interviews of personnel prior to resignation;" II, Administration Policies, with nine subdivisions beginning with "Control of Overtime" and ending with "Delegation of Authority;" III, Training Policies, with 20 subdivisions covering all phases of course planning, conduct, and evaluation and various other matters such as liaison, inter-Agency exchange, and

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the uses of [redacted] A more specific understanding of the Office

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of the DTR in the handling of administrative problems is conveyed by a review of action taken on a few special problems that arose during the 1953-56 period.

B. Special Problems

1. External Training

The external training problem had been with OTR since the origin of the Office. The training of CIA personnel in non-Agency facilities had been provided for in the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 (Public Law 110, 81st. Congress, 1st. Session), and the procedures governing such training were established in CIA Regulations [redacted]

25X

25X1 and No. [redacted] As noted in the first volume on this period, * until OTR was made responsible for all external training the various Agency components handled it on a sort of ad hoc basis; and because there was relatively little of it, there were few problems. Gradually, however, the problems increased. Although the volume of external training in foreign languages declined as OTR began to develop an internal language-training capability, there was a marked increase in external

* OTR-5, p. 50.

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training in other areas -- principally in attendance at the senior military schools. It soon became apparent to OTR that the existing regulations were no longer adequate.

On 13 March of 1953, the DTR had submitted to the Chief
25X1 of the DDA Regulations Control Staff a draft of proposed regulation

[redacted] which would replace both [redacted] The memo-
randum of transmittal of the draft stated that "The proposed regulation
has been coordinated with all Office Heads of the Agency, through
their Training Liaison Officers." Apparently, however, the coordina-
tion had been somewhat less than complete. After the distribution of
the draft to all Agency components, a number of proposed revisions
were submitted to the Special Assistant to the DDA (SA/DDA) -- over
whose signature the distribution had been made -- from virtually
every Agency Office, including OTR. 22/ On 15 April of 1953, the
SA/DDA sent to the DTR a memorandum summarizing the proposed
revisions, attaching the pertinent papers, and noting that some of the
concurrences were "conditional or qualified." 23/ Thereafter coor-
dination continued, and on 5 May the DTR submitted a "coordinated"
draft o [redacted] Again, the coordination process apparently was
incomplete, and as late as 24 August the Director of Security

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recommended two major changes. 25/ On 27 August still another draft was distributed. On 28 September, the Chief of Administration of the DDP area proposed revisions of this draft. 26/ The revisions were made, and on 2 November the SA/DDA submitted to the Acting DDA a final draft with the statement that no further coordination was necessary. 27/ The regulation was finally published on 1 December 1953 -- nearly ten months after the first "coordinated" draft was submitted. 28/

This long period of regulation incubation is not, of course, unique in the annals of the Agency; but it does show that all Agency components had a deep interest in external training, and it is an indication of the importance of OTR's mission in the management of external training. In the early stages of the coordination process, Mr. Baird had used the major elements of the proposed regulation as a basis for formulating policies on external training. On 27 May of 1953, he had submitted to the CIA Career Service Board a statement of these policies. 29/

None of the revisions introduced into [] during the long coordination process altered the 27 May policy statement, and 25X1 although [] underwent subsequent revisions -- the first one was

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initiated in August of 1955 -- the policy statement remained intact and continued to serve OTR and the Agency as a basic procedural guide. Because of that fact, it warrants a summary here.

The "General Statement" orients external training to career development: "In order that the function of training may be exercised more directly as an integral part of career service in CIA, the following policies shall govern training at non-CIA facilities." The first policy statement defines the kind of people who may be considered for external training -- people who intend to make a career with CIA, who have the capability to complete the training, and who have been selected for specific higher responsibilities. The second policy statement makes it clear that selection of people will be made in the interests of the Agency as a whole, not in the interest of any one component. The third statement deals with the basic criteria for individual recommendations, and the fourth deals with recommendation endorsement procedures. The fifth statement clarifies final selection authority -- the DCI has the authority for final selection of individuals "for training designed to broaden and develop high level executive, policy and planning skills;" the DTR has the authority for final selection of all others, and the "Director of Training may, in

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his discretion, and normally will, convene Advisory Boards to assist him in the recommendation or selection of individuals for training, as appropriate."

Most of the external training developments described above took place before December of 1953; but the problem itself carried over, and the development of it illustrates the nature of the administrative problems faced by the Office of the DTR. It is not the full story of external training during the 1953-56 period -- there were related problems concerned with a [redacted] Regulation, financing, definitions, and payment for overtime, but it does describe the establishment of the basic policies and procedures that were to govern the administration of external training thereafter.

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2. The Five-Percent Case

Another continuing problem that faced OTR administration during the 1953-56 period was that of discovering some valid basis on which planning of course instruction could be done. This problem was one that had plagued OTR from the beginning, and the DTR had made continuous efforts -- through the training liaison officers -- to induce Agency components to make realistic estimates of

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their training requirements.* Perhaps the most succinct statement of the problem was given in the Management Staff's January 1955 report of the survey of OTR:

It was difficult to establish workload estimates in the training elements. OTR, in attempting to fulfill its mission, obtains statements from the operating components of the Agency concerning their requirements and their estimates of the potential students in each category. Returns are processed and, where there is sufficient justification, courses are prepared and scheduled. All too frequently, it is not feasible to conduct classes because of insufficient student enrollment. This situation causes the Office to dissipate its resources needlessly. There is need for a firm Agency policy, supported by implementing directives, which would define the specialized training which the Agency considers necessary for each category of position in the various major fields of Agency activity or as a prerequisite for overseas assignment, with some means devised to provide a reasonably uniform flow of students through the training process. 30/

The "need for a firm Agency policy" had been brought to the attention of the Office of the DCI, and in October of 1954 the DDCI had stated such a policy. 31/ This statement -- at that time applicable to the DDP area only -- required that five percent of on-duty civilian staff employees at Headquarters be in a training status at all times. In his memorandum, the DDCI, then General Cabell, explained the rationale of the policy:

* See OTR-5, p. 51.

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The quota system is a short-range, probably temporary device for facing the fact that the Agency has not trained and is not now training enough people, intensely enough, to carry out grave and increasing responsibilities. It will operate until further notice, but should be recognized as only the first stage of a strenuous campaign to develop our capabilities. The quotas should be superseded by manpower and career planning which identifies 1) requirements for further operational plans for specific numbers of people with specific skills, 2) the people who will satisfy these needs, and 3) the training they will need. Arbitrary quotas will carry us in the right direction for a while, but as soon as possible we must tailor training plans to the needs of each individual and each operation, and not be satisfied with a quota approach.

About a year later, the five-percent requirement was extended to all Agency components by a CIA Notice, 32/ and on 18 July of 1956 an Agency regulation stating the policy, giving definitions, and describing approval and reporting procedures was published. 33/

The five-percent policy was controversial from the very beginning. Actually, it was also ineffective. Although it did provide OTR with somewhat firmer estimates of the overall training load, it soon became evident that the Agency components were evading the spirit of the policy by sending to training those people who could be spared without interruption of regular business. Some components actually developed what were informally called "five-percenter" cadres -- groups of people who spent virtually all of their time in

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training and thus permitted the component to meet the requirement.

The result was that some training programs had larger enrollments than before, but others -- particularly the more sophisticated operational courses -- had no increase in enrollment and thus no better basis for planning requirements.*

General Cabell, the originator and champion of the five-percent policy, recognized the weaknesses of it but defended it on the grounds that "It is a tangible way of demonstrating that training is an important part of our business, and that we must pay the price for it by devoting manhours to it . . . We have provided our executives with a tool -- with an understood and specified standard, below which they are not supposed to fall." 34/ To what extent General Cabell's defense of the policy was valid cannot, of course, be measured. In any event, the policy stayed in effect until June of 1960, when the five-percent regulation was rescinded. 35/

OTR's problem of estimating training requirements continued throughout the 1953-56 period and for some time thereafter, but by July of 1956 at least a start had been made toward its solution.

* To complete the brief and unhappy history of the five-percent policy, this account goes beyond the time-span of this chapter.

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That solution -- never a complete one -- ultimately turned out to be improvement of the training liaison system, primarily the appointment of senior officers as TLO's of the major Agency components and the development of training committees within the components.

3. The Instructor Development Program

Still another continuing administrative problem that was never fully solved was the staffing problem -- the problem of finding enough qualified instructors to fill the available positions. The "rotation system" appeared to be the ideal solution, but the system couldn't be made to work.* In February of 1955, Mr. Baird proposed another solution of the problem. In a memorandum to the DDS, he proposed the initiation of an "Instructor Development Program." 36/ The proposal stated, in part:

The difficulty encountered in finding qualified instructors for the courses given for DD/I and DD/S students is serious; it is particularly acute in relation to the operational courses for DD/P students, where the necessity for operationally experienced instructors is self-evident. However, highly knowledgeable operational and substantive personnel, making careers in DD/P, DD/I, and DD/S are not likely to be released to the Office of Training. In any case, they are made available for a tour with OTR of not more than 30 months, and there is no certainty that they will be able to

* See OTR-5, p. 111.

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teach effectively. Able instructors outside the Agency can be identified and recruited, but lack the necessary direct experience in the techniques and procedures peculiar to this Agency.

As one solution to the problem of getting qualified instructors, I propose the following plan. Teachers of proven ability will be recruited for OTR, given essential training, and then placed with DD/P, DD/I or DD/S for an appropriate overseas or headquarters assignment, returning at the end of a two-year tour to teach in OTR.

The proposal requested that "twenty slots (over and above the present OTR ceiling) be provided to the Office of Training for this purpose," and recommended that the program be initiated during 1955.

The proposal was approved by Col. White, the DDS, on 4 April with the typed notation under the approval signature: "The above course of action was recommended to the Deputy Director [General Cabell] and the Director [Mr. Dulles]. On 21 March 1955 the Director authorized the Deputy Director (Support) to proceed."

In Col. White's handwriting and subscribed with his initials there is this in addition: "The necessary T/O and ceiling changes are therefore authorized." 37/ On 26 April, the DTR wrote a memorandum to the DDS requesting that because "initial returns from the recruitment effort indicate that there are several candidates who are eligible and should be considered for recruitment at the GS-14 level" the grade

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
range for the instructor development program slots, from GS-11 through GS-13 in the original proposal, be extended to include GS-14.

38/ On 31 May the DDS replied, approving the request but limiting the number of GS-14 slots to six -- spread over a three-year period.

39/

Apparently the "initial returns from the recruitment effort" were overly optimistic. The record shows that a total of fifteen people were considered for positions; eight of them reached the interview and assessment stage, and five were actually brought on board.* There is no record of any action related to the program after December of 1955, 40/ and by the end of the year the project had apparently been dropped. Whatever the reasons for the early demise of the program, one of them certainly was the failure of the available candidates to meet OTR's requirements. This is suggested by a note written on the buck slip returning a candidate's file to the Agency

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recruiting officer; [redacted] then DDTR, wrote: "No interest. Not qualified by education and experience. We are looking for
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exceptionally qualified people. This man appears to be a job-hopper, without getting anywhere." 41/ Another reason, according to one of the five men who came in through the program, was the apparent inability of the personnel people to work out a satisfactory method of assigning the instructor trainees to operating components for the two-year on-the-job-training aspect of the program. The operating components would not release the slots for the trainees to occupy, and OTR could not let the men carry their OTR slots with them lest the program become slotless. As it developed, the trainees remained in OTR and only much later did they find rotational assignments in other components.

In all fairness to a gallant effort, it should be pointed out that of the few people who did come into the Agency through the Instructor Development Program all but one became career officers and made valuable contributions to both OTR and the operational components of CIA. The effort, then, was not a wasted one; and the abandonment of the program served to reaffirm the importance of the rotation policy as the best solution to the OTR staffing problem.

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4. Overseas Training

During the period from December of 1953 to July of 1956,

OTR became more deeply involved in problems of overseas training.

As recorded in the initial volume on this period,* early in the fall of

1953 Mr. Baird was directed by the DDCI to make an inspection trip.

to Far East training installations and recommend methods of improv-

ing the training efforts there. The major installation in the Far East

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was [redacted] most of the others served as satellite operations. In

Mr. Baird's report to the DCI, submitted on 5 October 1953, he made

a number of specific recommendations and concluded with this state-

ment: "It is our sincere hope that this visit was but the beginning of a

period of close cooperation between the Office of Training, the operat-


ing divisions and training installations in the field and that this coop-

eration will be implemented by a continued maintenance of a close

liaison and an exchange of training documents, materials and person-

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nel." 42/ The report was co-signed by the Chairman of the Clandes-



* See OTR-5, p. 108.

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This report apparently generated within the DDP area an intensive effort to examine and evaluate all of its overseas training activities. In August of 1954, the Chief of the Psychological and Paramilitary Operations Staff of the DDP submitted to the DDP "An Inventory of CIA Group Training of Indigenous Personnel at Overseas Installations." 43/ At that time there were [redacted] DDP training installations

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[redacted]

Apparently the findings of the DDP "Inventory" prompted a request to the DTR to make an analysis of Agency overseas training and make recommendations for revision and improvement.* In September of 1954, the DTR submitted to the DCI what amounted to a detailed staff study of the problem. 45/ The subject was "CIA Overseas Training," and the problem was stated as "To identify certain deficiencies known to exist in the Agency's overseas training effort,

* There appears to be no record of such a request, but subsequent developments imply clearly that one was made.

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and to propose action required to remove them." Obviously, the DTR's charter in the staff study included all of the Agency's overseas training activities.

Overseas communications training was given a light, laudatory brush in the study. In the "Discussions" section of the paper, Mr. Baird said ". . . the overseas Communications training effort of the Agency reflects a uniformly high standard of performance in all areas in which it is conducted . . ." and then went on to give the reasons for the excellence -- primarily the careful selection of trainees and the development of competent instructors. The DDP training activities, however, did not get the same kind of treatment. Mr. Baird found almost everything wrong with them -- incompetent instructors, poor training materials, lack of planning, failure to identify objectives, inconsistency with doctrine, lack of proper evaluation procedures, and lack of uniformity among the various training stations. He concluded that the major causes of the widespread deficiencies were lack of coordinated planning, failure to select competent instructors, and the absence of supervision.

The "Conclusions" section of the paper begins with this paragraph:

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As an initial step to improve the Agency's overseas group training effort, the role of the Director of Training requires clarification. While the Director of Training has explicit line responsibilities for the planning and direction of specified training in the United States, he has implicit staff responsibility for technical supervision of the total training effort of the Agency, including its overseas training effort, regardless of the allocation of line responsibility for training, in any given case. These implicit staff responsibilities should now be made explicit, in order that the Director of Training may bring the experience and competence of his Office to bear upon removal of existing deficiencies in the Agency's training effort.

Then follows a detailed identification of the "implicit staff responsibilities." The final paragraph of the "Conclusions" section states that "Vesting the Director of Training with authority and responsibilities set forth . . . above will eliminate the necessity for placing similar responsibilities upon the Clandestine Services Training Committee as recommended in reference c . . . While these are staff not line responsibilities, it is unsound management practice to vest a committee with other than purely review and advisory functions." The "reference c." mentioned was the 25 August memorandum written by the Chief of the DDP Psychological and Paramilitary Operations Staff.

In this staff study, then, Mr. Baird abandoned his earlier policy of cooperative non-interference with DDP overseas training and asserted the prerogatives of his position -- Director of all

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Agency training. His stand at this point was a milestone in the development of OTR, and it led directly to the addition of a major responsibility to those already carried by OTR.

25X1 In October of 1954, the Clandestine Services Training

Committee met to discuss action on the DTR's staff study. Appar-

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On 12 January 1955, the DCI, Mr. Dulles, sent a memorandum to the DDP, the DDA, the DTR, and the IG. Obviously the DCI had accepted the DTR's November objections to the Committee's findings; the memorandum stated that the "Findings" of the Committee were approved with the exception of the section that stated the responsibilities of the DTR. Mr. Dulles directed that that section be revised to read:

The Director of Training shall be responsible for technical supervision of all training activities on the site. This responsibility includes: approval of the qualifications of personnel nominated and assigned to serve on the training staff; approval of all training doctrine, methods of instruction, testing, evaluation, and assessment procedures and training materials used; headquarters coordination in planning and review of training projects for the site; headquarters technical support to the training effort on the site; and, assistance to the Chief, Inspection and Review Staff, DD/P, in periodic inspection and reporting on the status of the training effort.

On 31 January, Richard Helms, then Chief of DDP Operations, sent a memorandum to the chiefs of DDP senior staffs and area divisions informing them of the DCI's decision on the DTR's responsibility for the training [redacted] welcoming the "assistance" of OTR, and outlining procedures to implement the new arrangement. 48/

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It was in this way, then, that OTR became responsible for all training activities [redacted]. The actual supervision and staffing of the training programs there began in 1955, but by July of 1956 the transition was still in progress.*

C. Management Tools

The special problems described above were largely administrative ones in which OTR was involved with other Agency components. The internal administrative procedures that were established during this 1953-56 period were of equal long-range importance because they determined the modus operandi that OTR administration was to follow as long as Mr. Baird was DTR. Consequently, a summary description of the management tools is in order at this point.**

Perhaps the most effective of Mr. Baird's management tools was the weekly staff meeting. Of course there had been staff meetings in OTR since 1951, but the one that established the pattern --

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* The training activities [redacted] will be covered hereafter as functions of the OTR Operations School.

** This discussion, like the one on managerial style that follows it, is undocumented and is based on the experience of the author of this report, who served under Mr. Baird as instructor, branch chief, and school chief.

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the prototype meeting, so to speak -- was held on 8 December of 1953, following the 1 December reorganization of OTR.* Thereafter, staff meetings were held every week, usually on Friday mornings.** The DTR chaired the meetings, the DDTR and all school and staff chiefs, and the senior personnel officer attended. Substitutes could be sent, but it was clearly understood that attendance at staff meetings was a major responsibility of the school or staff chief, and absences had to be well justified. In the absence of the DTR, the DDTR chaired the meetings, of course, and on those rare occasions when neither could be present the Executive Officer acted as chairman.

The staff meeting usually began with the DTR's report of attendance at higher level meetings -- until February of 1955, the DCI's staff conference and the DDP staff meeting and thereafter the DDS and DDP meetings. In this report, the DTR passed along not only information that affected OTR directly but also information of general Agency interest. In this way, the DTR kept his key people current with Agency-wide activities and provided some measure of

* See OTR-5, p. 123.

** During the summer months, meetings were sometimes held on alternate Fridays.

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escape from parochialism. Following his own report, the DTR "went around the table," beginning with the DDTR. Each person present described major developments in his own area of interest and stressed problems that might affect others at the table. Throughout the meeting, interruptions for questions or contributing side-lights were frequent, and the give-and-take was always lively and sometimes heated.

It was clearly understood that the DTR expected the school and staff chiefs to pass along to those within their components the information surfaced at the DTR's staff meeting. It was not uncommon for Mr. Baird to go around the table and ask each of those present whether or not he had held staff meetings in his own component. The DTR's staff meetings, coupled with the component staff meetings, served as a tool of two-way communication within OTR.

These staff meetings did not provide, however, all of the upward communication that Mr. Baird felt was necessary. Consequently, there was a system of weekly reports. Each week the school and staff chiefs submitted to the DTR -- usually on Thursday mornings -- reports of component activities. These reports contained details that could not, or need not, be presented at the weekly staff meetings; they served to keep the DTR well informed about what

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was going on in OTR, and they also served as permanent records of problems and developments. Mr. Baird made a practice of reading these weekly reports thoroughly, and he was almost never embarrassed by first hearing of an OTR incident or situation from a non-OTR source.

Another management tool that the DTR used well was the OTR Career Board. The prototype of this was the Personnel Board of TR(S) established in May of 1952 by [redacted] then DDTR(S). 25X

In August of 1952, Mr. Baird established the OTR Career Service Board, which absorbed the TR(S) board and served both TR(S) and TR(G). * In October of 1954, Mr. Baird introduced the career-plan policy, requiring all OTR personnel to submit annually a written plan covering proposed career development and listing suggested training. Up to this point, the OTR Career Service Board was composed of a small group of senior people appointed by the DTR. On 19 October of 1954, the membership of the Board was expanded to include all school and staff chiefs. Thereafter the Board held periodic meetings to consider promotions and reassessments, and there was an extended annual

* TR(S) retained the promotion function of the Personnel Board, and in November of 1952 a TR(S) Promotion Panel was established.

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meeting to review the career plans of OTR personnel. In later years, career panels were formed to process promotions, reassessments, and career plans for clerical and support personnel, but the basic career board concept was retained throughout Mr. Baird's tenure as DTR.

D. Managerial Style

These were the major management tools that were developed during the 1953-56 period. The identification of the tools themselves, however, does not tell the whole management story. Just as important was how the tools were used and the climate of management itself -- the managerial style of the DTR. OTR during Mr. Baird's tenure has been described -- usually, but not always, affectionately -- as a "paternalistic monarchy" and a "benevolent despotism." Whatever the justification for these terms, it is quite true that Mr. Baird did run OTR with both a firm hand and a full measure of empathy. He made firm decisions, and he stood by them; but he gave full consideration to the opinions of others in OTR before he made those decisions. He was explicitly frank in criticizing mistakes that his school and staff chiefs made; but he was quick to praise good work, and when he delegated decision-making to any one of them he backed them up fully.

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He encouraged dissenting opinions; and although he sometimes reacted with touches of temper, he never used a dissent as grounds for penalty. He had a strong feeling about loyalty to OTR as an organization; he was consistently loyal to the members of the organization, and he expected their loyalty in return -- not to him as a man but to OTR itself.

Although Mr. Baird had been a military man, he had no particular reverence for the sanctity of command channels. He recognized the need for a chain-of-command structure, but he never let it stand in the way of getting things done -- and this approach worked both ways. He never hesitated to skip downward command channels and go directly to the person who was best qualified to give him the information he wanted, and he never refused to see anyone in OTR who had a problem that he felt couldn't be solved through routine channels. In the same vein, he encouraged his school and staff chiefs to go directly to non-OTR sources, high or low, with problems that could best be solved by direct contact. There was, however, one firm provision in this skip-channel activity at all levels: the people concerned in the command-channel structure had to be kept informed. If, for example, Mr. Baird called an instructor of an operations

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course for information of some kind, he would let the Chief of the Operations School know that he had done it or was going to do it; if the Chief of the Intelligence School went directly to the DDI with a question of course content, he would inform the DTR that he had done so or was going to do so. In other words, Mr. Baird encouraged and practiced the cutting of red tape, but he insisted that concerned people be informed of when and how the tape was cut.

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There was also a very personal element that gave color to Mr. Baird's managerial style. During most of his tenure as DTR, there were at least [redacted] people in OTR, either OTR careerists or people on rotational assignment to OTR. Mr. Baird made a practice of knowing them all by name and by sight, and he also knew something about them -- their background and, often, their personal problems. Apparently he kept a birthday anniversary tickler also; OTR people at all levels usually got a birthday greeting phone call from the boss if he was in the US and a letter if he was overseas at the time.

Managerial style is a tenuous and intangible thing, but it is often the major factor in creating an organizational climate. The development of Mr. Baird's managerial style during the 1953-56

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period certainly established the organizational climate of OTR, and an awareness of that climate is essential to an understanding of OTR's later development.

F. Key Personnel*

Another aspect of the development of administration in OTR from December of 1953 to July of 1956 was the definition of the roles of the Deputy Director of Training and the school and staff chiefs. This definition was largely a product of organizational development, the DTR's administrative practices, the management tools involved therein, and the organizational climate of the Office; but to some extent the definition was determined by the character and qualifications of the people who held the positions.

25X1 [redacted] who became DDTR with the December 1953 reorganization of OTR was -- as noted above** -- an OSS officer who had come into CIA through the CIG period and had held responsible positions in the Clandestine Services before he was appointed

* The OTR officers discussed in this section are those identified as key people by Mr. Baird in his 3 January 1955 progress report on the fifth anniversary of OTR. 49/

** See OTR-5, p. 120.

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DDTR(S) in April of 1953.* Before going into the Army in 1942, Dr.
25X1 [redacted] had received B. A. degrees from Yale and Oxford Universities, a Ph. D. from Yale, and a B. Litt. and an M. A. from Oxford. His areas of specialization were English, philosophy, politics, and economics. From 1939 until he had entered the service, he had taught history and literature at Harvard and at Radcliffe.

25X1 On 20 July 1955, [redacted] was succeeded as DDTR by

25X1 [redacted] had received his A. B. degree in chemistry from Oberlin College and his A. M. and Ph. D. degrees in art history from Harvard. He had taught at Athens College in Greece, the Gow School in New York, and Hollins College in Virginia. In 1943 he had gone into OSS as a Lieutenant in the U. S. Naval Reserve and served as a training officer in Egypt and a reports officer in Italy.

At the conclusion of his military service with OSS in 1945, he had taken the Harvard Ph. D. In 1948 he entered the clandestine services of CIA. When the OSO/OPC Training Division was reassigned to OTR, 25X1 [redacted] came with it as a division chief. Before his appointment as DDTR, he was Chief of the OTR Operations School.

* See OTR-5, Appendix B, p. 146, for the continuity of service of the DDTR and the school and staff chiefs.

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In the December 1953 reorganization of OTR, []

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[] was appointed Executive Officer and served at the same time as Chief of both the Administrative Staff and the Instructional Services Staff. [] had received his B. A. degree in economics and sociology from Indiana University and had attended the Harvard School of Business Administration. Thereafter he spent a number of years in the brokerage and investment business, and in 1949 he came into CIA as an instructor in the OSO/OPC Training Division. In July of 1951, Chief of the TR(C) Support Staff, and from July of 1952 until October of 1952 he served as Assistant Deputy Director of TR(S). He then returned to the Support Staff and remained in that position until he became the OTR Executive Officer in December of 1953.

Although []

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Served as acting chiefs of the OTR Plans and Policy Staff during parts of the 1953-56 period, the Chief of the Staff was []

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who was attending the National War College during the tenure of the acting chiefs. [] had studied architecture at the Armour Institute of Technology and the University of Michigan and had later practiced his profession both privately and for US Government agencies. He came into the CIG in October of 1946, and from that time

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until January of 1950 he served on the Plans and Policy Staff of the Office of Research and Estimates (ORE) -- the last two years as Chief of the Staff. In January of 1950, he became Chief of the OSO/OPC Training Division Planning Staff and remained in that position when TRD was reassigned to OTR. After his return from the National War College in December of 1954, [redacted] remained as Chief of the OTR Plans and Policy Staff until August of 1958.

In December of 1953, [redacted] had been Chief of the OTR Assessment and Evaluation Staff since February of that year when he had entered on duty with the Agency; he held that position 25X1 until August of 1959. [redacted] had received his B.A. and Ph.D. degrees in psychology from the University of Minnesota and had served as a psychologist with the public school systems of Minneapolis and Cincinnati. Later he spent three years in an industrial position, and in 1949 he became a research psychologist with the US Army. He entered the Agency early in 1953.

Although there were several OTR officers who served as division and school chiefs during the 1953-56 period, only a few of them can be properly identified as "key personnel" as far as the later

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development of OTR is concerned. One of these was [redacted]

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mentioned above, who was Chief of the Operations School before he became DDTR.

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[redacted] served as Chief of the Intelligence Training Division of TR(G) and the Chief of the OTR Intelligence Training School from May of 1952 until July of 1955. [redacted] A.B. degree from De Pauw University and the M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in political science from Harvard. He had been a journalist and a college professor before he entered the Army G-2 in 1941. He remained with G-2 until 1945 and later served the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of State. He entered the Agency in 1947 as Chief of the Northern Division of ORE. From 1950 to 1952, he served as CIA Staff Assistant to the National Security Council, and in May of 1952 he came to OTR as Chief of the Intelligence Training Division.

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25X1 [redacted] was appointed Chief of the CTR External and Language Training Division along with the December 1951 organization.

25X1 [redacted] held the A.B. degree in political science from Denison University, the M.A. in English from Trinity College, the M.A. in Chinese Language and Culture from the College of China, Studies in Peiping, and the Ph.D. in Chinese and Japanese

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Languages and History from Columbia University. For a number of years he was a professor of languages and history in universities in China and was an officer with the Department of State. From 1942 to 1946, he served with the OSS, and in 1948 he came to CIA as a Far East specialist with ORE.

25X1 [redacted] came to CIA in October of 1953 as Deputy Chief of the External and Language Training Division. In December of 1954, he was made Chief of the Basic Training School; in July of 1956, he became Chief of the Intelligence School, where he remained until he became DDTR in January of 1957. [redacted] 25X held the A. B. and M. A. degrees from the University of North Carolina, completed his residence work for the Ph. D. degree there, and had studied French at Middlebury College. He spent several years in university teaching, and in 1942 he entered the Counterintelligence Corps of the Army. In 1946, after leaving military service, joined the Department of State, where he served until 1953, primarily as training administrator.

These were the key people who played an important role in determining not only the administrative climate of OTR during the 1953-56 period but also the standards for other key people who were

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to follow them. Their qualifications and their performance in their jobs speak well for Mr. Baird's wisdom in selecting them. Perhaps it would be appropriate here to summarize Mr. Baird's own qualifications for the position of DTR. He held the B.A. and M.A. degrees in English from Princeton University and the B. Litt. degree in English from Oxford University. For ten years he was a master of the Haverford School and Headmaster at the Arizona Desert School. For three years he was a research economist with a major oil company, and for a much longer period of time he owned and operated a cattle ranch. He served as an Officer with the US Army Air Corps from 1942 until his release to inactive duty as a Colonel in December of 1945. He then returned to cattle ranch operation and remained there until December of 1950, when he was called to duty by the U.S. Air Force and assigned to CIA under General Smith, then the DCI.

III. Support

Because the functions of the OTR Plans and Policy Staff were directly related to the responsibilities of the Office of the DTR, that staff has been discussed as an element of OTR administration. During the period from December of 1953 to July of 1956, the actual support elements of the Office were the Support Staff and the Assessment and Evaluation Staff.

A. The Support Staff

1. Organizational Development

The reorganization of 4 December 1953, which established the position of Executive Officer, eliminated the earlier Support Staff as such and established an Administrative Staff and an Instructional Services Staff, both with chiefs but both under the actual command of the Executive Officer.* In December of 1954, the Support Staff was reestablished, with the Executive Officer as Chief. The branch elements of the Staff were the Administrative Branch, the Instructional Services Branch, and the Film Production Branch. Support of the [redacted] continued to be the responsibility of

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* See OTR-5, Figure 4, p. 121.

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the Executive Officer and was considered a function of the Support Staff, and at this time the Junior Officer Training Program, formerly a Division, was shifted to the Support Staff.* The JOTP was removed from the jurisdiction of the Support Staff and established at the School level in May of 1956,** but otherwise the staff structure remained the same through July of 1956. The activities of the Support Staff during the 1953-56 period can best be described, then, as they were conducted in December of 1954.

2. The Office of the Chief

The Office of the Chief of the Support Staff consisted of the Chief himself and a GS-07 secretary. Throughout this period, and for a decade thereafter, [redacted] served as Chief of the staff. In addition to his responsibilities of serving as the DTR's Executive Officer and supervising the branches of the staff, the Chief was also responsible for review and coordination of all proposed OTR

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* See Figure 1, p. 4.

** See Figure 2, p. 9.

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and Agency regulatory issuances,* for security, for records management, and for emergency evacuation programs. 50/ Also, of course, he attended the DTR's staff meetings and was a member of the OTR Career Service Board.

3. The Junior Officer Training Program

Although the JOTP at this time was officially an element of the Support Staff, it actually operated as a semi-autonomous group reporting to the DTR. This status was tacitly recognized and was even implicit in the official statement of the supervisory responsibility of the Chief of the Support Staff; he was to "exercise general supervision" over the JOTP. 51/

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Throughout this period, the Chief of the JOTP was Dr. [redacted] and his staff consisted of one training officer, a stenographer, and a clerk-typist. The official charter of the Chief of the JOTP was a broad one. It started with determining Agency requirements for junior officer personnel, and it included selection of

* In practice, however, the Plans and Policy Staff performed the major part of this function at this time and later took it over completely.

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recruits from outside the Agency and from Agency applicants, developing and coordinating training schedules, evaluating student performance, and recommending duty assignments.*

4. The Administrative Branch

One of the largest elements of the Support Staff was the
Administrative Branch, with a total of [redacted] In the office of
[redacted] 25X1 the Chief of the Branch -- from December of 1954 to May of 1956. [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] and thereafter through July of 1956 [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] 25X1 -- there were [redacted] administrative officers, a security offi-
[redacted] 25X1 cer, ** a records management officer, a military personnel officer,
an administrative assistant, a stenographer, and two clerk-typists.
The duties of the security, records management, and military personnel officers are implicit in their titles. The major responsibilities of the Chief of the Branch and his deputy were those related to supervising the work of the various sections of the Branch.

* As noted earlier in this paper, the detailed development of the JOTP will be covered in a separate historical monograph.

** In August of 1955, the security officer was removed from the Administrative Branch and reported directly to the Chief of the Support Staff.

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In December of 1954, the Administrative Branch, as it is described above, replaced the former Administrative Services Branch, which had had about the same composition and with which the Agency Management Staff survey had found some fault. The survey report said that there was "excessive administrative supervision" of
25X1 the [redacted] that there was "an excessive amount of mis-slotting" done by the [redacted] section; that the budget and fiscal section was guilty of all manner of accounting and processing misdemeanors -- short of embezzlement; that a survey of the [redacted] section X1 "should be made to reveal overlapping and duplicating data, reports, files, tasks, etc.;" and that the [redacted] section should not be preparing travel orders and travel vouchers. 52/ The report made appropriate recommendations for the elimination of the evils, and eventually the recommendations were implemented in one way or another -- specifically, as will be recorded later, in the "excessive administrative supervision" of the [redacted] and the survey 25X1 of the registrar function.

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5. The Instructional Services Branch

The December 1954 reorganization established the Instructional Services Branch (ISB) to replace the Training Support Branch. At this time, [redacted] was appointed Chief of the Branch, and on 17 August he was succeeded by [redacted]. The ISB had a personnel strength of [redacted] divided among the Office of the Chief and four sections. In the Office of the Chief there were three "education specialists" and one stenographer. One of the education specialists was the Chief himself, one was his deputy, and the third was an administrative assistant.

In the [redacted] of the branch there were [redacted] librarians and a library assistant. The section functioned as a branch of the Agency library system; but it served only OTR, and the personnel were in OTR slots. The main CIA library exercised no administrative control but provided procurement and reference services.

The [redacted] was composed of one education specialist, a stenographer, and [redacted] clerk-typists. The function of the section was to "provide for the editing, reproduction and

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distribution of OTR internal training publications; the distribution of Agency training type publications; and the reproduction and distribution of OTR regulatory material." 53/

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In the [redacted] were one visual aids special-

25X1 ist, [redacted] illustrators, one junior illustrator, a display technician, and a photographer. In the [redacted] there was a visual

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25X1 information specialist, [redacted] electronics mechanics, a motion picture projectionist, and a clerk.

The ISB as it was established in December of 1954 did not include, as had its predecessor, the [redacted] an instructor training element. The responsibility for instructor training was assigned to the Basic School, and in June of 1956 it was absorbed by the newly created Intelligence School. Another difference in the composition of the ISB was the change of the [redacted]

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[redacted] of the former Training Support Branch to a separate branch of the Support Staff.

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6. The Film Production Branch

The nomenclature of the personnel positions assigned to the Film Production Branch in December of 1954 was consistent with the mission of the branch. The Chief of the branch, [redacted]

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was in a "script writer" position. His deputy was in a "director" position; there was also an "assistant director" position, and the fourth position was a stenographer slot. Included in the responsibilities of the branch were the development of plans and projects to meet OTR long-range requirements for training films; the production of scripts consistent with Agency doctrine; the coordination of those scripts with the Agency's substantive experts; the recruiting of casts for the films produced; the actual production of the films; and the management of supporting personnel, of materiel, and of funds. 54/

At the time that the branch was established, OTR had already become deeply involved in the production of training films, and the personnel of the branch had already demonstrated a capability for production. On 12 July of 1954, the first training film produced

25X1 by what was then the [redacted] of the Training Support Branch of the Support Staff was shown to all OTR personnel. 55/ The background and development of the film production activities of OTR are described in some detail later in this volume.*

* see below, p. 81.

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C. The Assessment and Evaluation Staff

1. Organizational Structure

The December 1953 reorganization of OTR established the A&E Staff, which had formerly been a component of TRD, TR(C), and TR(S) successively, as an OTR staff reporting directly to the DTR.

The reorganization of December 1954 made no change in the mission or structure of the staff.* [redacted] continued as Chief, 25X and in that capacity he supervised [redacted] in his own administrative 25X group and four branches. In the Office of the Chief were [redacted] psychologists, 25X an administrative assistant, a training clerk, and 3 clerk-stenographers. In the Assessment Branch were 9 psychologists, 2 junior psychologists, and a test clerk. In the Training Evaluation

25X1 Branch there were [redacted] psychologists, and 4 statistical clerks. In the Testing Services Branch there were 2 psychologists, 3 junior psychologists, and a clerk-typist. 58/

* In November of 1954, however, the EOD testing function was transferred, along with six positions and their incumbents, from the Office of Personnel to the OTR A&E Staff. 57/

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2. Missions

Because the A&E Staff played an important role in virtually every aspect of OTR training activities, it is appropriate here to list the official functions of the staff as they were stated late in 1954:

- a. Provide psychological services to the Office of Training [redacted]

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- b. Provide intensive psychological assessment of individuals referred, to assist in determining their suitability for certain positions of a critical and sensitive nature, and to analyze psychological factors important for the jobs for which assessment is conducted.

- c. Develop, apply and interpret psychological assessment techniques and methodology to determine professionally the abilities, limitations and possibilities inherent in candidates for the Junior Officer Training Program, the Career Development Program, [redacted] and in other appropriate groups and individuals.

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- d. Develop, apply and interpret psychological evaluation techniques appropriate to each of the courses offered by the Office of Training in order to determine student ability to learn, the psychological elements of course content, the effectiveness of instruction, appropriate means of testing and evaluation, and what other phases of training operation may be susceptible to the application of psychological analysis.

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- e. Develop, adapt, coordinate, apply and interpret any or all types of objective, projective, and situation testing techniques which may be appropriate to the Agency needs.
- f. Operate and administer all testing programs and recommend improvements to the operational aspects of testing techniques.
- g. Operate a continuous research activity in order to improve forms, techniques, procedures and results of all Staff programs and to explore new areas in which psychological services might be provided to the Office of Training or other Agency components.
- h. Maintain liaison with other governmental, quasi-official and private organizations and individuals concerned with psychological matters. 59/

3. Accomplishments

Although the official statement of the missions of the A&E Staff gives some indication of the scope of the Staff's responsibilities, it does not show the nature of the work actually done or the quantitative measure of that work. The activities of the A&E Staff during the 1953-56 period can be divided into three categories: selection and placement, training, and special programs. 60/

The selection and placement activities were concerned with the pre-entrance testing of recruits and the testing of professional employees already on board. In the pre-entrance testing, the staff

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worked closely with the Agency's field recruiters, supplying the testing materials and analyzing the results. In the testing of professionals on board, the staff administered the Professional Employee Test Battery or any one of twenty special tests, analyzed the results, and provided guidance for placement of the people tested.

In the training activity, the staff was concerned with providing guidance and support to OTR instructors in all phases of their training duties. The staff analyzed course plans, lesson plans, and testing techniques and suggested revisions and additions and helped instructors to design effective student performance evaluations. In addition, the staff administered and analyzed the language aptitude tests for OTR's language training program.

There were two kinds of special programs conducted by the staff. One was a program of intensive assessment for the overseas assignment of Agency personnel [redacted]
[redacted] The other was assistance to Agency supervisory personnel in the selection of employees for special training, reassignment of employees, and devising fitness report forms.


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In terms of measurable quantitative accomplishments, the records show that in 1953 the staff tested about 800 individuals, in 1954 about 1,800, and in 1955 about 2,500. In 1953, about 600 assessments were performed, in 1954 about 525, and in 1955 about 625. In 1953, about 1,000 training evaluations were processed, and in 1955 the figure rose to more than 4,000. The number of tests administered -- often several to one individual -- in 1954 was about 15,000; in 1955, more than 35,000 tests were given. 61/

D. Special Support Projects

During the 1953-56 period, two major support activities that had begun in previous years came to developmental maturity. Both were Support Staff activities, but both were of sufficient long-range importance to warrant separate discussion and to justify coverage of background and some extension beyond the time-span of this chapter.

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* See OTR-5, p. 81.

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that time, however, OTR had developed [redacted] into a highly successful operation, and the establishment of the project stands as a major achievement in training support.

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2. [redacted]

Early in 1952, OTR had made a survey of the need for audio-visual training aids in the Agency and had concluded that the greatest need was for training films. 94/ Films had always been used in Agency training, of course, but they were either films made by US and British military training units or general-release films containing some aspects of operational tradecraft. OTR used such films not only in headquarters and field-base training courses but also supplied divisional overseas training units. From July of 1951 to February of 1953, for example, OTR had sent 419 films to overseas training centers. 95/

The 1952 survey had concluded that although such training films were of value, they lacked the authenticity that films directly related to Agency operations would have. Consequently, OTR proposed a three-phase program for the production of films by an OTR unit. The first phase would be a series of films on air-support activities -- considered at that time to be the most immediate

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need. The second phase would be a series of seven films on basic operational techniques. The third phase would be a series of films on advanced clandestine operations. 96/

The proposal was apparently discussed at various administrative levels for almost a year,* and on 2 February of 1953 the Chief of the Project Administrative Planning Staff of the DDA submitted to the DTR an administrative plan for the film production program.

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[redacted] 97/ This plan covered virtually every aspect of the program: cover, funding, control, accounting, security, procurement, and personnel.

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Mr. Baird must have had full knowledge of the plan some time before it was officially submitted to him on 2 February -- indeed he was probably the designer of it, for on 3 February he submitted to the Agency Project Review Committee a proposal for establishing the

* There appears to be no record of such discussions, but subsequent documents indicate that they must have taken place.

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film production program. 98/ His proposal did not mention the DDA Planning Staff plan, but it was consistent with the provisions of the plan. The proposal stated that the "Problem" was "to increase the scope, quality and effectiveness of OTR training programs dealing with the technical and psychological aspects of clandestine operations through the use of Agency-produced training films." The "Facts Bearing on the Problem" were related to the recognized effectiveness of films in training, the current use of non-Agency films in OTR training, and the full professional capability of OTR staff personnel to produce training films. The "Discussion" enlarged upon and expanded the facts, and the "Conclusions" were those implicit in the facts. The "Recommendations" were these: "a. OTR be authorized to undertake a film project involving the production of six air-support films and that \$273, 700. 00 be appropriated to implement the project.
b. OTR be authorized to submit subsequently to PRC requests for additional funds to cover production when further film requirements are developed." 99/ Mr. Baird's proposal, then, requested not only authorization and funds for the first phase of the program but also a kind of blanket approval of the other two phases.

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On 26 March of 1953, the DTR wrote a memorandum to the DDCI reporting the results of these investigations. 106/ Attached to this memorandum were three staff studies. The first was a report

25X1 to the DTR from [redacted]

director who was at that time largely responsible for the development of the OTR film unit and who had investigated the [redacted] facilities. 107/ This report concluded that such facilities should not be used -- and gave the reasons for the conclusion -- but suggested that there was a possibility that an [redacted] film processing unit,

25X1 [redacted] might be a facility that the Agency could use. The second attached staff study was a report of the investigation of the [redacted] 108/ This study concluded that the [redacted] should not be used because the cost would be

25X1 too high, security would be difficult to maintain, and transportation problems would disrupt film production schedules. The third attached staff study recommended strongly that the [redacted] facilities should not be acquired and gave detailed support for the recommendation. 109/

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With the three staff studies to back him up, Mr. Baird recommended in his 26 March memorandum to the DDCI that none of the proposed facilities be used and implied that commercial facilities would be the best possible solution -- as he had recommended in his original project proposal. Between 26 March and 20 July of 1953, however, there were apparently some unrecorded "negotiations" that induced the DTR to retreat from his position. Despite all of OTR's

25X1 recommendations and the strong objections raised by the Chiefs of the [redacted] and the Special Security Division, someone decided

25X1 that [redacted] would be used. In the absence of any information to the contrary, it might be assumed that the reason for the decision lay in the fact that the Chairman of the Agency Project Review Committee -- [redacted]

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nated -- was senior to all of the others involved, except the DDCI,

25X1 who -- once he had asked the [redacted] for help -- may have felt that it would be ungracious to spurn their offer.

In any event, on 20 July the DTR sent to the Project

Review Committee a request for approval and implementation of

25X1 [redacted] and in the request was the recommendation that "OTR be authorized to utilize the motion picture facilities at

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[redacted] 110/ The request included a statement of the cost of Phase One of the project -- the air support series: \$55,000. Implementation was approved by the Chairman of the Project Review Committee and by the DDA, the DDI, the DDP, and the DCI. On 7 August, the DCI approved the requested \$55,000 allotment.

Production of the air-support series began immediately, under the name of Operation [redacted]

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were used in the shooting of the exterior scenes of the film, Agency personnel were used in the production crew and the cast, the cast was

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transported to the [redacted] for the interior scenes, and the film was processed there. When it was completed,

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[redacted] was an 18-reel, 35mm film that ran more than two hours in the showing. 111/ The first screening of the film -- to OTR personnel only -- was held in the auditorium of [redacted] on 12 July 25X of 1954. Thereafter for several years, [redacted] was one of the 25X basic training aids used in air operations and air-support training.

On 16 June of 1954, while [redacted] was still in the final editing process, the DTR requested the Project Review Committee to approve the implementation of phase two of [redacted] 112/ 25X

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Phase two was to begin with a film on the selection and acquisition of agents, and Mr. Baird's 16 June memorandum described the project in considerable detail -- the need for the film, the use to which it would be put, the costs, and all aspects of the cover plan. The production program was an ambitious one. The film would be a twelve-reel production that would cost a total of \$100,000. The action would ostensibly take place in various foreign cities -- [redacted]

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[redacted] About 50,000 feet of exterior footage would be shot in these locations, with the cast present. The shooting was to be silent, and the narration would be recorded later. The interior scenes would

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[redacted]

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The 16 June request for approval of the implementation
25X1 of phase two of [redacted] was approved, the funds were allocated,
and the early stages of production began at once.* A preliminary
draft of the script had been completed by [redacted] and had been

25X1 coordinated with the clandestine services. In the fall of 1954, Mr.

25X1 [redacted] the production
assistant, made an advance trip abroad to identify filming sites and
25X1 establish liaison contacts. The trip was made under the [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] production plan. During
25X1 this trip, [redacted] was not a
25X1 satisfactory site and chose [redacted] instead.

Following the advance trip abroad, casting began. Security dictated that all members of the cast had to be Agency personnel, and the film production staff explored personnel records, interviewed "types," and issued invitations to try-outs. Finally a cast was assembled -- not, however, without some pain and one very important consequence. In the early stages of the casting effort, the

* This summary account of the production of the film, undocumented for the most part, is based on interviews with OTR personnel who were involved in the film throughout the production process.

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of four case histories, completed in June of 1961. Early in 1962, OTR embarked on a major new film production program -- the "DDI Series." This program is discussed in a later volume.*

In retrospect, the initiation [redacted]

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appears to have been a bold venture; and the success with which the project was developed, under pressures of curtailed finances and limited personnel, is surprising. Perhaps the explanation is that the small group of people who constituted the film production unit were both capable and dedicated, and the Director of Training was not only firmly convinced that films -- films produced for the Agency by the Agency -- were essential factors in training but also had the courage of his convictions in his efforts to gain his superiors' approval of the 25X1 program. In any event, [redacted] stands as a major achievement in the annals of Agency training.

* OTR-8. The OTR film production effort through 1961 has been described in this chapter to consolidate coverage of the first ten years of the activity.

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IV. Intelligence and Administrative Training

The reorganization of OTR in December of 1953 did not affect those components that were concerned with intelligence and administrative training -- the Intelligence Training Division, the Orientation and Briefing Division, and the Management Training Division. The first two of these divisions had been established in July of 1951,* and the third in September of 1952.** In December of 1954, however, the "Division" designation was dropped and "School" was used instead;*** the work of the former Management Training Division was assigned to the Intelligence Training School, and the Orientation and Briefing Division became the Basic Training School, with some added responsibilities. The result was that the Basic school handled the orientation courses, the management and supervision courses, the administrative support courses, the clerical training courses, and the instructional techniques courses; the Intelligence school handled the courses related to intelligence research and analysis, intelligence writing and briefing,

* See OTR-5, Figure 1, p. 14.

** See OTR-5, Figure 2, p. 21.

*** See Figure 1, p. 4.

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communism, and reading improvement. This allocation of responsibilities stood until 15 June of 1956, when the Basic and Intelligence Training Schools were merged as the Intelligence School, and the School of International Communism was established.* By June of 1956, then, all courses related to intelligence and administrative training had become the responsibility of a single school, and during the greater part of the 1953-56 period courses in communism had been in the "intelligence" category. Therefore, intelligence and administrative courses are treated here as a group composed of orientation courses, intelligence and communism courses, management and supervision courses, clerical training courses, operations support courses, and the instructional techniques course.

* See Figure 3, p. 10.

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A. Orientation Courses*

1. The National Intelligence Orientation Program

In 1951 OTR had introduced the National Intelligence Orientation Program, a 12-hour (reduced to 6-hour in 1954) assembly for all new Agency employees above the GS-04 grade. The program was held four times each year in the Department of Agriculture auditorium, and the speakers included top Agency officials, including the DCI; high-ranking military officers; and senior government officials, including a vice-president or two. The general purpose of the program was to acquaint new employees with the intelligence community and its function in the US Government.

Originally, the program was organized by the Basic Training Division of TR(G). In September of 1952, it became a function of the TR(G) Orientation and Briefing Division. In November of

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1952, [redacted] an exceedingly articulate and charming man with a flair for exploiting the Irish mystique, was appointed Chief of the division; and from that time until it was discontinued in September of 1955 the program was known as the [redacted]

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* The factual data given in this and the following discussions of courses are extracted from records in the office of the OTR Registrar.

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Actually, [redacted] left the Agency late in 1954, and [redacted]

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[redacted] took over responsibility for the program; but the colorful

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[redacted] aura stayed on. In September of 1955, the Director of

Training had concluded that it was "unnecessary to continue a separate, large-scale orientation and time-consuming activity which had become largely redundant," and he recommended discontinuation of the program. 114/ The records of the OTR registrar show that even though the program may have been time-consuming and redundant, a great many Agency people were exposed to it: 2,156 in fiscal year 1953 and 1,485 in fiscal year 1955, for example.

2. The Intelligence Orientation Course

The DTR's reference to the redundancy of the National Intelligence Orientation Program was based on the fact that other orientation programs were covering much the same substantive content -- without, of course, the top-brass adornment. Since 1951, TR(S) had offered a three-week course called "Basic Intelligence Course (Clandestine Services)," and TR(G) had given a course called "Basic Orientation." Both of these courses covered the role of the Agency in the intelligence community and the US Government. Late in 1953, the two courses were combined as the "Basic Intelligence

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Course," a six-week program beginning with an orientation phase and covering the basic principles and techniques of intelligence and the role of international communism. During fiscal year 1953, about 165 students completed the course, and in the next fiscal year about 369.*

In the December 1954 reorganization of OTR, the course was split. The first phase of it was assigned to the new Basic Training School and became the Basic Orientation Course; the second phase of the course became the Intelligence Principles and Methods Course in the Intelligence Training School, and the communism segment was given as a separate course. After the Basic and Intelligence Training Schools were merged in June of 1956, the Basic Orientation Course became the Intelligence Orientation Course, a four-week program of which the first two weeks were given by the Intelligence School and the second two weeks by the new School of International Communism.**

* In March of 1953, attendance in this course was made mandatory for all new professional employees of the Agency, 115/ and subsequent versions of it continued to be required by regulation.


** The chronological sequence of the orientation courses is shown in Figure 4, p. 101.

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Figure 4

Orientation Courses
1951 - 1966



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3. The CIA Introduction

In 1951, TR(G) had introduced a program called "CIA Introduction." This was a three-hour meeting held either weekly or semi-weekly -- depending on the entrance-on-duty rate -- at headquarters for all new employees of the Agency. It served as a very general introduction to the intelligence environment, and it provided an opportunity for all new employees to be briefed on the personal security aspects of the business. The course was first given by the TR(G) Basic Training Division, then by the TR(G) and OTR Orientation and Briefing Division; in December of 1954 the Basic Training School took it over, and in June of 1956 it became one of the programs of the Special Orientation Faculty of the Intelligence School.

4. The CIA Review

In 1955, the Basic Training School introduced the CIA Review, a three-hour reorientation program designed for Agency personnel who had returned from extended overseas assignments. The objective of the program was to acquaint returning personnel with changes that had taken place within the Agency and the intelligence community during their absence, with new trends in intelligence

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activities, and with new Agency programs that were being developed. This course, too, continued as a permanent part of OTR's training program and was absorbed by the Intelligence School in June of 1956.

5. Special Orientation Briefings

An important part of the work done by the OTR components that were responsible for orientation programs was the briefing of non-Agency groups and individuals. From the beginning of OTR as an Agency Office, it had assumed the responsibility for providing informational briefings to government groups and officials who had a need to know about the mission, organization, and function of the Agency. Originally this job fell to OTR because the chiefs of the various operating and production components of the Agency felt that instructors could be more easily spared for such unscheduled chores than could the operational officers or the analysts. Whether or not that was a valid conclusion, OTR accepted the job, and eventually it became the full-time activity of a senior OTR officer.*

* This activity is described in some detail later, in OTR-8.

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B. Intelligence and Communism Courses

1. Intelligence

Until December of 1954, the second phase of the six-week Basic Intelligence course was a two-week segment devoted to the principles of intelligence and the techniques used in collection, production, and dissemination. Following the December 1954 reorganization, this segment became a separate course, Intelligence Principles and Methods, given by the Intelligence Training School and extended to a four-week course that included a reading analysis program -- six hours spread over a two-week part of the main course. The IPM course, as it was called, was designed primarily for DDI analysts; it was a do-it-yourself course involving the actual preparation and production of various kinds of finished intelligence. It was offered four times a year throughout 1955 and 1956 and for some years thereafter.

Early in 1953, at the request of the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence, the Intelligence Training Division of TR(G) had established a course called "Intermediate Intelligence Course (Scientific)." It was designed for analysts of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, and it was conducted as a 70-hour series of seminars in

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a ten-day period. Late in 1954, the name of the course was changed to "Scientific Intelligence." Throughout 1955 and 1956, the course was given "on request" -- whenever OSI had a need for it.

A similar course, Research Methods, was introduced early in 1953; it was designed to aid the DDI analyst in the exploitation of intelligence sources -- libraries, repositories, and registers. Before the end of 1954, the course was dropped because enrollment did not warrant continuation; in later years it was revived.

Throughout 1953 and most of 1954, the Intelligence Training Division of TR(G) offered a course called "Problems of Intelligence Writing." In December of 1954, the name of the course was changed to "Intelligence Writing," and early in 1956 it became "Writing Workshop." At that time the length of the course was changed from 52 hours spread over a three-week period to 27 hours over a four-week period. This course, incidentally, was the forerunner of a very effective three-phase Writing Workshop Program that was to be developed a few years later.*

* See OTR-8.

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In 1953 and 1954, there was a course called "Intermediate Intelligence Course (Oral Briefing)," which became Intelligence Briefing at the end of 1954 and Effective Speaking in 1955 when a contract instructor, [redacted] was 25X brought in to teach it. It was a 24-hour course composed of two two-hour sessions a week over a period of six weeks. [redacted] also 25X gave a Conference Leadership course that was organized in the same way. Both of these courses, incidentally, continued to be given by 25X1 [redacted] into the late 1960s.


Early in 1954, there appeared to be a need for experienced DDS officers to know more about the intelligence community, the substantive nature of intelligence, and the essential facts about communism. Consequently, a course called "Intelligence Refresher/ DDS" was established. It met in two two-hour sessions each week for a period of six weeks. The records show that it was given twice in 1954 for small groups of students and then discontinued -- probably because it covered much the same ground that the Basic Orientation course covered, and all professional personnel were required to take that course.

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Early in 1955, at the request of the Assistant Director for Operations, a course was organized for experienced field personnel of the Contact Division of the Office of Operations. It was called the "OO/C Refresher," ran virtually full time for two weeks, and provided a review of developments in intelligence organization and policy. The course was given three times during the year; for each running, from 15 to 20 contact specialists were brought to Washington from the

25X1



2. Reading Improvement

As recorded in the preceding volume of this paper,* OTR had inherited from TRD, through TR(C), a small reading improvement laboratory and had expanded the reading improvement program throughout 1951 and 1952. In 1953, the reading program became a segment of the Basic Intelligence Course. In December of 1954, when the Basic course was split into the Basic Orientation Course and the Intelligence Principles and Methods Course, the latter included a reading analysis segment, and Reading Improvement became a separate course. It was a 30-hour program, one hour each working day

* See OTR-5, p. 34.

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for six weeks; it included lectures, discussions, and practice exercises using special films, the Reading Rate Accelerator, and various kinds of tachistoscopes. A retention program involving re-tests 8 weeks and 12 months after completion of the course was a part of the instruction. Two professionally trained instructors and an assistant made up the reading improvement faculty.

In 1954, an Advanced Reading Improvement course and a Reading Improvement (French) course were introduced. The advanced course was a more sophisticated version of the basic course, with emphasis on scanning, informational reading, and intensive reading of technical publications. It ran for 18 hours, one and one-half hours three days a week for four weeks. The French version of the course was similar to the advanced course. The prerequisite was three years of college French or the equivalent, and the course ran for 32 hours over an eight-week period. This course was given three times during 1955 and was then discontinued because of lack of enrollment.

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The reading improvement training continued to be one of OTR's most outstanding programs until September of 1958, when it was abruptly dropped.*

3. Communism

Throughout most of 1953, the three-week Basic Intelligence Course (Clandestine Services), given by TR(S), included a one-week segment on communist ideology, history, methods, and tactics.

116/ In December of 1953, the TR(S) basic course was absorbed by the Basic Training Division, and the communism phase became one of the parts of the OTR Basic Intelligence Course. Throughout this period, a separate, three-week course called "Communist Party Operations" was given by the Intelligence Training Division. In December of 1954, the name of the course was changed to "World Communism" -- probably to make a clear distinction between this course and a new course in Anti-Communist Operations given by the

* The official reason for this action was the need for economy. The real reason may have been sensitivity to Congressional criticism. See OTR-5, p. 35.

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Operations Training School. 117/ The one-week introductory coverage of communism continued as a part of the Basic Orientation Course -- formerly Part I of the Basic Intelligence Course.

The objective of the World Communism course was to present the history, theory, structures and organizations, strategy and tactics, and operations of communist parties. The course analyzed the structures and functions of communist party organs, including the development of cadres, propaganda, and finance. Special attention was given to communist clandestine operations -- military, intelligence, and underground. When the School of International Communism was established in June of 1956, the World Communism course continued as a four-week, full-time course given by the new school five times a year. 118/

C. Management and Supervision Courses

As recorded in the preceding volume of this paper,* OTR's initial effort in the field of management training was launched in August of 1952 with the offering of the "Human Resources Program." This was a half-day seminar designed to give Agency supervisors an introduction to management principles and problems. The program

* See OTR-5, p. 31.

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was designed and conducted by [redacted] a former Johns Hopkins University professor whom Mr. Baird had brought in in 1951, primarily to help with the development of the career-service program.

From the beginning, the Human Resources Program stirred controversy. [redacted] felt that internal compartmentation and excessive secrecy erected almost impenetrable barriers to good management practices. He preached this doctrine in his lectures and -- of course -- aroused the antagonism and resistance of the entire DDP area. 119/

The program continued, however, and when it was terminated in July of 1954 more than 600 Agency supervisors had attended. The DDP resistance to [redacted] attack on clandestine parochialism was certainly one reason for the dropping of the project. Another reason was the opinion expressed by the CIA Inspector General to the DCI in April of 1954 -- the opinion that the course laid too much stress on the weaknesses of Agency management and too little on specific methods for improving it. 120/ The IG did not mention the specific method [redacted] advocated: break down the barriers.

The IG did, however, mention the need for more and better training in management and supervision and thus gave impetus to the first actual management training course given in the Agency,

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the Basic Management Course. This was first offered in January of 1954. It had been put together by [redacted] then working as 25X1 [redacted] assistant in the Management Training Division, and 25X1 [redacted] was the chief instructor. The course was designed for supervisory personnel at the branch-chief level. It ran for ten half-days over a two-week period, a total of 40 hours. The content of the course was related to an analysis of middle-management responsibilities, doctrine then current in the management field, management techniques in use in the Agency, and analysis of problem situations and case histories. The course was offered seven times a year, and in fiscal year 1955 about 150 people were enrolled and in fiscal year 1956 about 160.

25X

In October of 1954, a course in Basic Supervision was introduced. This course was originally designed for substantive or technical specialists, at or below the GS-11 level, who had no management experience but were assigned to work with groups or task forces as supervisors. Later, of course, the design changed to cover all types of first-line supervisors in the Agency. Basic Supervision was a 40-hour course spread over a two-week period. It stressed problems of person-to-person relationships, training, communication,

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25X1 leadership, and discipline. Early in 1954, [redacted] joined [redacted]

[redacted] in the management training group, and

25X1 [redacted] served as chief instructor of the Basic Supervision course.

The course was offered six times a year, and in fiscal year 1955 about 155 students completed the program and in fiscal year 1956 about 200.

Throughout 1956 and 1957, these two courses, Basic Management and Basic Supervision, constituted the management train-

25X1 ing program. [redacted] left the Agency early in 1955, and Dr.

25X1 [redacted] continued as the management training

"faculty" for some time -- after the Management Training Division was absorbed by the Basic Training School in December of 1954 and the Basic school was absorbed by the Intelligence School in June of 1956.

D. Clerical Training Courses

In the OTR organization as it was established in July of 1951, there was a Clerical Training Division in the area of the Assistant Director of Training (Overt).* In December of 1952, a Management Training Division was established in the TR(G) -- formerly TR(O) --

* See OTR-5, Figure 1, p. 14.

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area, and clerical training was included in that Division,* where it stayed and was absorbed later by the Basic Training School and the Intelligence School, in turn. As of December of 1952, then, the clerical training courses were given as a function of the Management Training Division, and by that time the major elements of the program had become stabilized.

The first unit of the program was Clerical Induction, designed for clerical recruits -- many with only provisional clearance. It gave them a general introduction to clerical practices in the Agency, a chance to brush up on their typing and shorthand skills, a brief review of grammar, and a little geography. It also provided time for the Agency's personnel machinery to process papers and for security clearances to be completed. This clerical induction process had been handled by the Office of Personnel until May of 1952, when it was turned over to OTR.

The second unit of clerical training was Clerical Orientation. It was a three-day program designed to acquaint fully cleared clericals with the Agency's mission, organization, and function. Those

* See OTR-5, Figure 2, p. 21.

recruits who were cleared by the end of the induction program went directly into orientation; those who were not cleared were assigned to a "pool" where they did unclassified clerical chores until their clearances came through; they then went to the orientation program.

There was also at this time a three-week program called "Clerical Refresher," a course that had been introduced in 1951. This was designed for clericals who had been on duty in the Agency for a year or more and who wanted to improve their clerical skills to prepare themselves for promotion or reassignment. The refresher program was composed of six different units -- one on grammar review, one on punctuation and capitalization, and four on various levels of typing and shorthand. Any one of the units could be taken alone, or any group of them could be taken -- depending on the student's need.

In 1954 and 1955, additional courses in clerical training were introduced. There was a course called "Clerical Intelligence Terminology" that was offered in 1954 and given only twice -- it is mentioned in the OTR registrar's records, but it did not live long enough to appear in an OTR catalog. A "Non-Clerical Typing" course was also introduced in 1954, a part-time, 30-hour typing course for non-clerical personnel who felt the need to improve their typing skills.

This course was given "on request," sometimes on Agency time and sometimes on the students' time. There was also a Clerical Reorientation course, a one-day program for experienced clerical personnel who had a need to improve their grasp of the Agency's mission, organization, and function. This was introduced in 1955, as was an Advanced Typing course.

25X1 During the major part of the 1953-56 period, [redacted] 25X
[redacted] was in charge of the clerical training program. In June of
25X1 1956, she was replaced by [redacted] who -- in turn -- was
25X1 replaced by [redacted] in November of 1956. [redacted] 25X
left the clerical training assignment, incidentally, to take over supervision of the operations support courses; [redacted] left clerical 25X
training to join the management training group. During fiscal year
1953 about 2,150 students completed the induction, orientation, and
refresher phases of the clerical training program and in fiscal year
1956 about 2,860.

E. Operations Support Courses

Like the clerical training program, the operations support training program came to the Basic Training School in December of 1953 from the Management Training Division of TR(O) and TR(G).

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Throughout the 1953-56 period, there were three courses in the operations support training program of the Basic School -- Administrative Procedures, Administrative Support (later Operations Support), and Interviewing and Reporting.

Administrative Procedures had originated in 1951 as a program to train clerical personnel for assignment to the clandestine services, both at headquarters and at overseas stations. It was concerned with the basic procedures of administrative support, the functions of the various DDP staff elements supporting the DDP, and with the operational and security hazards involved in support functions. The course ran full time for two weeks, and by the beginning of 1955 it was being offered five times each year.

The Administrative Support course was introduced in 1953, and early in 1955 the name was changed to Operations Support -- undoubtedly to dispel confusion with the Administrative Procedures course. The Ops Support course, as it came to be called, was a full-time, four-week program designed for non-clerical administrative and support personnel of the clandestine services. Clerical personnel who were to be assigned to non-clerical positions in the DDP were also admitted. The course was given in two phases -- tradecraft

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principles, and administrative support functions. The first of these introduced the students to the basic principles of covert operations and the organization and function of the clandestine services. The second phase was concerned with procedures, regulations, projects, and problems peculiar to the support of the clandestine services -- logistics, finance, cables, dispatches, and travel. The course was offered five times each year.

The Interviewing and Reporting course had originated in 1951 as the "reports" course. It was designed for DDP personnel, mostly non-clerical, whose duties were to include that of a "reports officer" at an overseas station or base; later it came to serve a more general purpose and was open to all DDP personnel who had a need to improve their interviewing and reporting techniques. It was a one-week, full-time course that included lectures on basic principles, demonstrations, problem exercises, and critiques of performance. The course was at first scheduled "as required," but during calendar year 1955 it had four pre-scheduled runnings. With the OTR reorganization in June of 1956, the course was assigned to the headquarters training branch of the Operations School and has since been given as the Information Reporting, Reports, and Requirements course.

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F. The Instructor Training Course

As mentioned above, in December of 1954 the instructor training program was shifted from the Instructional Services Staff to the Basic Training School. The Instructional Services Staff had inherited the program from the TR(S) Training Development Staff in December of 1953. During the 1953-56 period, the Basic school gave the program in the form of an Instructional Techniques course. It was a one-week, full-time course designed for OTR instructor personnel -- many of whom had high substantive or operational competence but little or no teaching experience. The course covered the basic principles of instruction, preparation of lesson plans, and methods of using demonstration and audio-visual techniques in the classroom. The course was offered five times each year, and the course instructors were always available for tutorial instruction when it was needed.

In June of 1956, the instructional techniques course was absorbed by the Intelligence School -- as were all of the intelligence and administrative training courses described above -- except the interviewing and reporting course. The subsequent development of these various programs is covered in a later report on the 1951-66 period.

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V. Language and Area Training

The early development of OTR's efforts in language and area training are related in OTR-5.* From the very beginning, these efforts were hampered by a number of serious problems. It proved impossible to get from the various Agency components realistic estimates of their training requirements. Because OTR had virtually no capability for internal language or area training, external facilities had to be used; external facilities were expensive and insecure, and it was extremely difficult to maintain any control of quality or content. In addition, as the number of applicants for external training grew, the problem of screening applicants became a major one.

All of these problems were still with OTR in December of 1953, but some progress had been made. The number of external training facilities had been increased, and the cost had been somewhat reduced by shifting a large part of the training enrollments from private institutions to government facilities. The screening of applicants had been systematized. An experienced language training expert had been brought into the Agency to develop an internal capability, and a

* Page 49, ff.

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language training laboratory had been established. A definite trend away from the use of external facilities and toward internal language training was already apparent in December of 1953. It is the development of this trend in both language and area training that will be traced here through the 1953-56 period.

A. Language Training

From December of 1953 to July of 1956, there was no major breakthrough in OTR's language training program. Late in 1955, however, the beginning of a breakthrough emerged -- the beginning that led later to the Language Development Program. Although this beginning and the gradual evolution of the concept involved came during the 1953-56 period, the official establishment of the Language Development Program did not take place until February of 1957. In the interests of coherence, then, the overall development of the program is discussed in a later volume, OTR-9. The present discussion covers the actual progress of both internal and external language training during the 1953-56 period.

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1. Internal Training

The records of the OTR registrar provide a significant summary of the trend toward greater use of internal language training. In December of 1953, as shown by the monthly average records, the ratio of internal to external language trainees was about one to three; in June of 1956, it was about three to one. At the end of calendar year 1953, 228 students had been enrolled in ten languages -- Chinese, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Persian, Polish, Russian, and Spanish. In calendar year 1954, 538 students were given language training in OTR courses, and to the list of languages five had been added -- Albanian, Arabic, Czech, Hungarian, and Portuguese. In 1955, the number of language students trained internally was about the same as in 1954, but five more languages were given -- Greek, Indonesian, Turkish, Finnish, and Slovak. In addition to the languages actually taught during these years, OTR had an internal capability of offering Afrikaans, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Serbo-Croatian.

To some extent, the pattern of internal language course offerings reflected the shift in the Agency's geographical areas of interest. In 1953, for example, only two courses in Russian were offered -- both at the basic level; by the end of 1954, twelve different

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courses in Russian were being offered in OTR, ranging from Elementary Russian through Scientific Russian Reading. Component courses in Russian were also being given -- with OTR support and instruction -- in the Office of Research and Reports and the Foreign Documents Division of the Office of Operations. In 1953, only three courses in German were given, but in 1954 there were five; courses in Persian rose from one to five and in Japanese from two to three. In 1954, there were fewer course offerings in French, Spanish, and Italian.

2. External Training

Some measure of the decline in the use of external facilities for language training is supplied by the OTR registrar's statistical records. In calendar year 1953, there were 862 Agency students enrolled in external programs -- 298 in full-time study and 564 in part-time study. In 1954, the total dropped to 634 -- 174 full time and 460 part time. In 1955, the total was 678 -- 272 full time and 406 part time; the 1955 total was slightly above that of 1954 but well below that of 1953.

By the end of 1954, the trend toward making greater use of other government facilities and lesser use of private institutions had become apparent. The ties with Georgetown University were

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maintained as they had been, and the possibility of access to language programs in other academic institutions was retained; but there was a marked shift in actual enrollment to the language programs in the Foreign Service Institute and the language schools of the Army and Navy.

The use of other-agency language schools did not solve all the problems of language training. Understandably, these programs were slanted to meet the needs of the individual agency. The military programs stressed the technical aspects of foreign languages, and the Foreign Service Institute was concerned primarily with diplomatic communication. All of the other-agency programs were very expensive -- particularly the Army language school, where enrollment involved travel and the movement of personal effects. Security hazards were fewer in other-agency schools than in academic facilities, but they were still present. Finally, the other-agency schools were not able to accommodate the numbers of Agency people that needed training. All of these factors increased the pressure to build up OTR's internal language training capability.

B. Area Training

As recorded in the preceding volume of this paper,* several attempts had been made during the 1951-53 period to provide comprehensive area training programs for Agency personnel. These attempts failed, largely, and OTR was forced to use whatever external facilities were available. The cost of this kind of training was exorbitant, the substance was not oriented toward intelligence, and the security hazards were great. Again, the only answer appeared to be the development of an internal capability.

OTR worked on this problem throughout the 1953-56 period, and by July of 1956 an internal area training program had been developed. It was run by a two-man staff, and guest speakers provided the greater part of the instruction; both Agency and non-Agency area specialists were used as lecturers, seminar leaders, and consultants. In this way, three rather comprehensive area training programs were offered.

* See OTR-5, p. 58.

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The first of these was the Basic Country Survey, "an introduction to the study of the sociological, political and economic factors, which historically and currently influence the culture, attitudes, development and foreign relations of each country with which the United States is concerned." 121/ As of July of 1956, programs covering Germany, Japan, and the USSR were offered; and additional area coverage was being developed.

The second course was the Regional Survey, "an introduction to the various regional aspects and developments of significant groupings of foreign countries, such as the Arab States or Southeast Asia, the emphasis being directed toward the regional integrity or inter-relationship rather than the component parts." 122/ The subjects covered in the surveys were the Middle East, Economic Factors in Asia, the Fertile Crescent, Free Europe, the National Interest of the US in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, Russia in Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Soviet Bloc.

The third course was Americans Abroad, "an introduction to social customs, significant cultural and national attitudes and sensitivities, traditional and current attitudes toward foreigners, and

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other matters affecting overseas duty in a given country or area." 123/

The "given" countries and areas were the [redacted]

25X

25X1

[redacted]
These three programs provided most of the area training that Agency people needed. Some external area training was still available, but only for those who could qualify as advanced area specialists.

25X1

[redacted]
C. The Language and Area Staff

OTR's language and area training staff began in 1951, when Mr. Baird brought in from [redacted] 25X to serve as a consultant on the development of a language training program.* Later that same year, [redacted] became an Agency staff officer as chief of the newly created External Training Division. ** From that time until he left the Agency in June of 1953, [redacted] 25X staff consisted of three instructors, one laboratory technician, and two clerk-typists. 124/ In the meantime, the External Training

* See OTR-5, p. 52.

** See OTR-5, Figure 1, p. 14.

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Division had changed to the Language Services Division; and this had
become the External and Language Training Division when [redacted] 25X
25X1 [redacted] as chief of the language and area train-
ing program. By December of 1953, [redacted] had acquired two 25X
additional instructors.

During 1954, the teaching staff of five instructors -- engaged in giving part-time instruction in French, German, Italian, Spanish, and Russian -- was supplemented by non-OTR Agency personnel who worked on a part-time detail basis teaching various other languages.

In July of 1955, an additional staff instructor was brought in to develop a program of full-time instruction in Russian, and in the development of this program it became necessary to hire non-Agency instructors on a contract basis. Thereafter, the use of contract instructors permitted the development of the internal capability to give full-time language training in all but the most esoteric languages.

By July of 1956, the External and Language Training Division had changed to the Language, Area, and External Training School and again to the Language and Area School. [redacted] was still chief, 25X
25X1 and his deputy was [redacted] whose major concern was area training. There were four "Departments" in the school:

Romance Languages, Chinese and Japanese Languages, Germanic Languages, and Slavic Languages. There were 18 personnel positions -- 2 training officers (the chief and his deputy), an administrative assistant, 10 scientific linguists, and 5 clericals. 125/ It was with this basic staff that language and area training began to expand rapidly late in 1956 and continued for some years thereafter.

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VI. Operations Training

Volume I of this history described the development of clandestine training in OTR from July of 1951 to December of 1953.* Earlier in the present chapter, changes in the organizational structure were traced from December of 1953 to June of 1956, when the Operations Training School became the Operations School.** The discussion that follows picks up the thread of clandestine training activities in December of 1953 and follows it through to July of 1956. Key personnel are identified, and the general size of the instructor force is noted; developments in headquarters training, field training, covert training, and overseas training are recorded; and various clandestine training problems are discussed.

A. Personnel

The December 1953 reorganization of OTR combined the four former training divisions of TR(S) into two divisions, the Specialized Training Division and the Project Training Division.*** [redacted]

25X

* OTR-5.

** See Figure 3, p. 10.

*** See OTR-5, Figure 4, p. 121.

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25X1

[redacted] who had been appointed Chief of the TR(S) Advanced Training Division in August of 1953, became Chief of the Specialized Training Division; and [redacted] became Chief of the Project Training Division. In December of 1954, the two divisions were merged as the Operations Training School,* and [redacted] became Chief of the

school. He remained in that position until the end of January of 1955, when he was replaced by Harry Rositzke, a senior DDP careerist assigned to OTR, who held the position until October of 1956.**

The December 1954 reorganization of OTR created a Deputy Chief of the Operations Training School and three assistant chiefs.

25X1 [redacted]
 [redacted] became Assistant Chief for Headquarters Training, [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted] became Assistant Chief for Covert Training, and [redacted]
 25X1 [redacted] became Assistant Chief for Field Training. [redacted] stayed in the deputy chief position until February of 1956, when he was appointed

* See Figure 1, p. 4.

** From June until October of 1956, Mr. Rositzke officially held two positions -- Chief of the Operations School and Chief of the School of International Communism.

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25X1

[redacted] stayed in the covert training position until March of 1957, and [redacted] supervised field training until October of 1956.* 25X

25X1

bered [redacted] of this total, [redacted] were clerical and training support personnel, [redacted] to instructor positions in the Agency, and [redacted] were Agency staff officers in supervisory or instructor positions. The total does not, of course, include the [redacted] support positions under the direction of the [redacted] 25X

25X1

[redacted]
In the office of the Chief of the Operations Training School, there were two training officers -- the chief and his deputy -- and one clerical position. Covert training had [redacted] and instructor positions -- four of them military -- and [redacted] clerical positions. Head-quarters training had [redacted] officer and instructor positions -- four of [redacted]

* For a complete sequence of personnel assignments during this period, see OTR-5, Appendix B, p. 146.

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25X1

them military -- and [redacted] clerical positions. Field training, the larg-

25X1

est of the components, had [redacted] and instructor positions -- [redacted] of

25X

25X1

them military -- and [redacted] clerical positions.

B. Headquarters Training

By December of 1953, the two major clandestine training

courses -- Operations Course (Phase II) and Covert Activities (Phase

III) -- had been shifted from headquarters [redacted]

25X

Although this relocation was logical as the [redacted] facilities

25X

developed and was termed by the CIA Inspector General "one of the greatest advancements made in Training," 127/ it left relatively few

courses, all with small enrollments, in the headquarters area. A

three-week course in Counterespionage was given for groups of

between 6 and 15 students, and three runnings a year were scheduled.

A three-week course in Clandestine [redacted] was offered for

25X

groups of the same size and on the same schedule. Two weeks of a

25X1

three-week [redacted] course were given at headquarters;

25X1

the third week was given [redacted] A two-week course in Opera-

tional Security was scheduled once during the year for a group of

between 6 and 12 students, and a two-week Order of Battle course

was offered for an equally small group.

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During 1954, headquarters training expanded its activities with the introduction of a number of new courses. The existing Counterespionage course was shortened from three weeks to two, and a two-week Advanced Counterespionage course was added. A three-week War Plans Staff course was introduced in October of 1954. Perhaps the most important new programs established in 1954 were Project USEFUL and the Clandestine Services Review.

Project USEFUL was a one-week, full-time program designed to meet the need-to-know requirements of military officers who worked with CIA officers in activities of mutual concern -- usually at overseas locations. The program provided -- in addition to the basic mission, organization, and function information -- an historical summary of the development of CIA and of the rationale for the existence of the Agency, an identification of the areas of mutual military-Agency concern, and a description of the methods and techniques used by the Agency in overseas activity. Most of the speakers were high-level Agency officials, including the DCI and the Deputy Directors, and following each speaker's presentation there was a question-and-answer period. Most of the students, about 50 in the earlier groups, were brought to Washington by the Department of Defense from their posts

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with the Unified and Specified Commands. All of the service branches were represented; the largest part of each group, naturally, was the Army contingent. The program was offered once in 1954 and twice each year thereafter.

The Clandestine Services Review, a three-week, full-time course, was established to meet a requirement that had been growing throughout the Agency's early years of expansion and development. Clandestine services officers in increasing numbers had been completing overseas assignments and returning for tours of duty at headquarters. During their absence, changes had taken place -- changes in organization, procedures, doctrine, methods, and areas of emphasis. The one-day CIA Review, described earlier in this volume,* served to acquaint the returnees with general overall changes in the Agency, but it could not give them the depth of coverage they needed -- particularly of the clandestine services. The first CSR, as the Clandestine Services Review came to be called, was given in November of 1954.

* See above, p. 96.


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Thereafter, six runnings were offered each calendar year. Perhaps the best summary of the coverage provided by the CSR is the original statement given in the OTR Catalog of Courses dated December 1954:

By means of lectures, seminars, tours and selected reading material, the description and examination of current policy, objectives, organization, problems of operational emphasis, current methods of personnel management and fiscal administration, and current capabilities for providing operational and intelligence support will be undertaken. Primary emphasis will be given to the operations, structure, procedures and regulations of DD/P. In addition, discussion of other Agency components will be undertaken to ensure proper understanding of their activities in a relation to the total Agency effort, and their capacity to support the work of DD/P.

In 1955, the headquarters training staff introduced a two-week
25X1 course in [redacted] and a course in Investigative Techniques. In addition, there were a number of "technical" courses given at headquarters -- courses in which the Technical Services Staff of the DDP provided the instruction and OTR furnished the management and



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Orientation course, a part-time three- to five-week Advanced Operational [redacted] course, and specially tailored courses in
25X1 Printing Techniques and Photography.

C. Field Training

By December of 1953, the special paramilitary training projects that had taken so much of OTR's time and manpower since 1951
25X1 - [redacted] - had been terminated,* and field training activities had been concentrated at
25X1 [redacted] ** At that time, all training at the [redacted]
became the responsibility of the Project Training Division of OTR,
and with the December 1954 reorganization the responsibility became
that of the Field Training Staff of the Operations Training School.

At the end of 1953, nine courses were being given at [redacted]
25X1 [redacted] and during 1954 three courses were added. The number of courses remained at about that level through 1955 and the first half of 1956, but late in 1955 there was a major change that increased the instructional load considerably. The five-week Clandestine Methods

* See OTR-5, p. 88.

** Because the development of [redacted] is covered in detail in a separate historical paper, only a brief summary is given here.

and Techniques course and the five-week Clandestine Operations course were combined in a 16-week Operations course. This required complete revision of the former courses and the development of new materials and problems. The first Operations course began in January of 1956, and for a decade thereafter the course was one of the

25X1 major training programs [redacted]

Another important addition to training [redacted] came in November of 1955 with the introduction of the Operations Familiarization course. This was a six-week program originally designed for DDP non-case-officer personnel whose assignments required a thorough understanding of clandestine activities. Later the course was opened to DDS officers engaged in DDP support and to a few DDI officers whose jobs required familiarization with operational techniques.

25X


25X1 This course, too, has continued to be a major element in training at [redacted]

D. Covert Training

Since the beginning of training activities in CIA, the training of deep-cover American agents, foreign national contract agents, and members of foreign intelligence and security services had been an important factor in operational training. Because of the absolute

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By December of 1953, the basic elements of the covert training program were well established. Safehouse sites in the Washington

25X1 [redacted] areas were in operation, instructor cadres had been organized to serve both areas, procedures for enrollment and for the conduct of training had been standardized, and training materials had been developed. During fiscal year 1953, a total of [redacted] people were

25X1 trained covertly -- [redacted]

25X

129/

As of December 1953, there were two covert training courses listed in the OTR catalog -- Training for Nationals of This Country and Training for Nationals of All Other Countries. 130/ The two courses had the same subject content. In both there were two major categories of training -- Clandestine Intelligence Activity and Clandestine Warfare Activity. Within the first category were listed 18 specific tradecraft subjects such as surveillance, recruitment, and agent

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25X1 The Overseas Training Staff was not solely concerned with
[redacted] but served the needs of all overseas training activities. During
25X1 1955, for example, the staff provided materials for DDP training pro-

[redacted]
Far East Division to serve as the first Assistant Chief for Overseas
Training, and under her direction the support of all overseas training
activities grew to be one of the most effective of OTR's programs.

25X1 [redacted] continued in the position for more than a decade.

F. Problems

During the 1953-56 period, operations training was faced with a number of problems, some of them carried over from earlier years and some of them new ones. The two major continuing problems were those of staffing and of getting from the DDP the doctrine, materials, and requirements that were necessary in the designing and scheduling of courses. The two major new problems were the decreasing availability of students and the ambiguous command struc-

25X1 ture [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~1. Staffing

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, it had always been difficult for OTR to get from the DDP experienced operations officers to serve as instructors; the demands of operations in the field always had higher priority than those of Training. Mr. Baird felt that one of the major reasons for the relatively low-priority status of training in the DDP was the relatively low status of the DDP training liaison officers. 140/ The DDP TLO's were, for the most part, junior administrative officers with other major duties; they were able to bring very little, if any, pressure to bear on the component chiefs who had the authority to assign officers to a tour of duty with OTR. Mr. Baird believed that the only solution to the problem was the appointment as Senior DDP Training Officer of a man who had the rank and status to bring real pressures to bear. In theory, the Clandestine Services Training Committee could exert such pressures, but it did not. In April of 1954, the Inspector General reported to the DCI that the committee "handled the mechanical liaison relationships satisfactorily [but] it was not of sufficient stature to impress upon DD/P units the essentiality of training." 141/

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With the IG statement to back him up, Mr. Baird continued his efforts to have a senior DDP training officer appointed, and by the end of 1956 he was successful. Mr. Thomas Karamessines, a former Chief of Station and at that time deputy to the DDP, was appointed. One of his duties as Senior DDP TLO was to establish and maintain a regular rotation of officers between the clandestine services and OTR. Thereafter, the staffing problem began to become less critical; but throughout the 1953-56 period it continued to plague operations training.

2. Doctrine, Materials, and Requirements

To a great extent, the clandestine services failed to provide OTR with approved doctrine, live-problem materials, and realistic estimates of training requirements for the same reasons they failed to provide instructors -- the low priority of training and the ineffectiveness of the DDP TLO's. In the absence of real pressures to support training, the operating components were too busy operating to spend time defining and standardizing operational doctrine. When requested to provide operational records for use as training materials, they resisted on the ground that such records were too "sensitive" to

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be used. Estimates of training requirements were left to the component TLO's, who were often capricious in their guesses and who had no authority to back up their commitments.

The consequence was that during the 1953-56 period, OTR instructors had to make-do with what was available -- teach doctrine as they understood it, contrive fictional materials for problems, and cancel courses when promised enrollments did not materialize. These problems, too, began to diminish with the appointment of the senior DDP training officer, and eventually satisfactory DDP support of training was developed.

3. Availability of Students

From 1951 to the latter part of 1953, the availability of students for training had not been a major problem for OTR. The vastly overestimated requirements and site preparations for paramilitary training in the 1951-53 period was not an availability problem; the students didn't materialize, of course, but there was no instructional staff to handle them even if they had.* There were plenty of students available to engage the full time of the small OTR staff in

* See OTR-5, p. 111.

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1951 and 1952, and in 1953 an Agency regulation 142/ [redacted]

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[redacted] gave enough impetus to enroll-
ments to keep the growing staff fully occupied.

Early in 1954, however, enrollments in operations training courses began to drop off, and OTR became concerned. The trend continued, and OTR's increased concern led to the DDCI's 1954 initiation of the five-percent quota system -- at first applied only to the Clandestine Services and later extended to cover all Agency components.* In spite of the five-percent requirement, enrollments continued to decline. Not only did the operating components use the evasion devices described earlier in this chapter, ** but also they began to take greater advantage of the escape clauses in the Agency regulation

25X1

[redacted] In this problem, also, the inadequacies of the DDP TLO's and the CS Training Committee played a major role. Some quantitative measure of the problem is provided by the

* See above, p. 29.

** See above, p. 32.


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statistical records of the OTR registrar. During calendar year 1953, there were about 2,500 full-time students enrolled in operations training courses; in calendar year 1956, there were about 900.

There were, of course, several reasons for the decline in enrollment -- in addition to the reluctance of the CS components to make students available. In 1953, the Agency's personnel intake was much greater than in 1956. By the beginning of 1956, a much greater number of Clandestine Services officers had completed operations training courses, and with the decline of new-on-board CS professionals there was naturally a decline in enrollment in the basic operations courses. An additional factor was the 1955 combination of the two major operations courses into one 16-week course, which made release for training more difficult.

One interesting and unhappy result of the non-availability of students -- and, of course, the non-availability of CS officers



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VII. Summary

This volume has described the development of Agency training from December of 1953 to July of 1956. The major organizational change within OTR during the period was the elimination of TR(G) and TR(S), each under a separate Deputy Director of Training, and the establishment of Divisions -- later Schools -- the chiefs of which reported directly to the DTR or to his alter ego, the single DDTR. The most significant change in OTR's organizational position in the Agency was the shifting of the Office from the jurisdiction of the Office of the Director to the Office of the Deputy Director for Support. Perhaps the best approach to a substantive summary of this volume is that of drawing some conclusions about the general characteristics of the 1953-56 period, identifying significant beginnings, and commenting on the progress that OTR made in the achievement of status and stature within the Agency. To provide a transitional bridge to the development of OTR after the 1953-56 period, a brief preview of following volumes will also be given.

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A. General Characteristics

When OTR came into existence in 1951, its organizational structure was determined by the need to accommodate its heritage from the former Training Division of OSO/OPC. From that time until late in 1953, this compromise pattern was retained. The reorganization of December of 1953 was the first step in establishing an organizational structure consistent with the responsibilities of the Office. Throughout the 1953-56 period, further steps were taken; and by the end of the period a firm organizational pattern had been established. One of the general characteristics of the period, then, was evolutionary organizational change.

A second characteristic of the period was the clarification of missions, responsibilities, and authorities -- those of the components within OTR and those of OTR in relation to other Agency components. Internally, duplication of effort was eliminated and conflicts of authority were dissolved. Externally, OTR's function as an Office-level Agency component with jurisdiction over all Agency training was firmly established.

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Another characteristic of the period was the development within OTR of a cadre of professional training officers. A career service was established, and the members of the OTR career service gradually became identified as OTR people -- without divisive allegiances to other Agency components. With this trend came the development of loyalty to OTR and dedication to the job that had to be done.

A final characteristic of the period was the continuing appearance of major problems and the beginnings of solutions. Among these were the problems of obtaining firm operational doctrine, reliable training requirements, and realistic training materials. There was also the problem of staffing OTR with instructors who had the necessary substantive and operational competence. In addition, there were problems created by the additional responsibilities that OTR assumed

[redacted] for example. 25)

B. Significant Beginnings

The significance of beginnings is relative, of course, and almost always determined in the light of subsequent events. Accepting that criterion, there are a number of developments within OTR during the 1953-56 period that can be identified as particularly significant: the beginning of OTR's overseas training program at [redacted] the use

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[redacted] as the major site for operations training and the accompanying [redacted] project, the creation of an internal capability for language training, and the establishment of a film-making capability. Although the Junior Officer Training Program was actually begun in an earlier period, some of the more important aspects of recruitment, training, and assignment were introduced during the 1953-56 period.

C. Progress Toward Stature

In December of 1953, the status of OTR was still somewhat uncertain. Mr. Baird had not yet been fully accepted as Director of Training -- particularly by the Clandestine Services; training was still considered by many senior Agency officers as a peripheral activity that should not be allowed to interfere with business-as-usual; and the all-too-common "those who can, do; those who can't, teach" attitude created a prejudice that marked OTR as a haven for incompetents.

By July of 1956, these barriers had been largely broken down. With strong support from his superiors -- particularly the DDCI, Gen. Cabell -- Mr. Baird had become fully accepted, and the inertia and resistance of most Agency components had been overcome. OTR had made real progress toward achieving the stature that it deserved and needed.

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D. A Look Ahead

Because the early years of OTR's development were of great significance in establishing foundations for later progress, and because documentary evidence has a tendency to dissipate as the years go by, the first two volumes on the 1951-1966 period cover those early years in considerable detail when the available documents provide that detail -- the resort to assumption and speculation occurs only in the absence of such documentation. Subsequent volumes will be somewhat less detailed and somewhat more selective in coverage.

It is anticipated that specific volumes will be prepared to cover the following aspects of OTR's development during the period from July of 1956 to January of 1966: management and support activities, intelligence and support training, language and area training, communism training, and operations training. Although aspects of training can be categorized, they cannot be isolated one from the other; the many areas of common concern and joint activity are sometimes covered within the context of one of the categories and are given only brief mention in others.

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
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